On August 1, 2017, China opened its first oversea military basal, in the East african state of Djibouti. This was a landmark consequence that raised a unharmed host of questions for Indo-Pacific states : Is Djibouti the first of other bases to come ? If so, how many ? Where will China build them ? How will they be used ? Where do they fit into chinese military strategy ? chinese policymakers and analysts are pondering these same questions. however, they are employing concepts alone to chinese strategic discourse, and it is necessity to grasp these concepts in order to understand how Beijing intends to project military power abroad .
For the People ’ s Republic of China ( PRC ), the condition “ oversea military base ” ( haiwai junshi jidi, 海外军事基地 ) carries significant historical baggage : foreign imperialists built them on the dirty of early countries in order to colonize and exploit them. On the other pass, chinese policymakers have come to recognize the measure of maintaining locations oversea where the chinese military—above all, the People ’ sulfur Liberation Army Navy ( PLAN ) —can concentrate resources needed to support operations overseas. To distinguish chinese actions from the marauding deeds of western and japanese imperialists, chinese military thinkers have adopted a specialize condition : the “ strategic potent luff ” ( zhanlüe zhidian, 战略支点 ). [1] A careful analysis of the taiwanese use of this concept offers valuable insights into Beijing ’ s strategic intentions outside of East Asia .
Understanding the “Strategic Strong Point” Concept
The term “ strategic impregnable point ” has different meanings, depending on the context in which it is used. In some cases it refers to a quasi-alliance relationship ; in other cases, it is used in the context of overseas ports ( Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making, No. 2, 2017 ). The 2013 Science of Military Strategy describes them as locations that “ provide support for abroad military operations or act as a ahead base for deploying military forces abroad ” ( military skill Publishing, December 2013 ). The PLAN ’ s new adeptness in Djibouti has been called China ’ s first “ oversea strategic strong point ” ( World Affairs, July 26, 2017 ) .
The condition is not fair applied to chinese bases : U.S. bases in the Pacific and indian Oceans are besides sometimes described as strategic strong points, and chinese observers have spent considerable prison term examining these bases in order to inform their own thinking on developing oversea strategic impregnable points. between 2016 and 2017, the PLAN ’ s official magazine Navy Today ran a series of articles, each one discussing the features and strategic roles of person U.S. bases. One refers to Pearl Harbor as a “ strategic impregnable point in America ’ s ahead defense, ” without which its defensive lines would be limited to the fatherland ( Navy Today, June 24 2016 ). Two others describe the roles of Diego Garcia and Guam as strategic impregnable points critical to Washington ’ mho ball-shaped strategy. [2]
however, taiwanese experts are promptly to point out that China ’ s strategic strong points are basically different from those of other states. They state that China ’ s strategic strong points offer benefits to host states and provide them with public security goods. furthermore, these sites will not be used to conduct offense operations, as is the case with the oversea bases of other states. [3]
The Need for Strategic Strong Points
Strategic strong points will improve the chinese military ’ s ability to operate oversea. presently, the PLAN conducts the huge majority of the PRC ’ s military missions afield. The PLAN serves two primary functions : protecting China ’ s ocean lines of communication ( SLOCs ), and safeguarding China ’ second oversea interests. Both require ahead presence in strategically important areas of the Indo-Pacific. According to the Science of Military Strategy, an expansion of the geographic scope of naval operations requires the institution of refilling points and “ versatile forms of limited pull presence ” ( Science of Military Strateg y, December 2013 ) .
Strategic potent points fulfill these demands. An engineer at the Academy of Military Science ’ s Institute of Logistics explains that oversea strategic strong points will support the military ’ s long-range projection capabilities by efficaciously shortening resupply intervals and expanding the stove of support for chinese forces operating abroad ( National Defense, December 2017 ). however, refilling ships alone can not meet the Navy ’ south needs. As the deputy chief of the PLAN Operations Department wrote in 2010, personnel easing, equipment serve, and the uncertainties of extraneous moor facilities were limiting factors in the long-run regularization of oversea operations. chinese facilities in oversea ports are the following dance step in building an “ oversea support system. ” [4]
plan Commander Adm. Wu Shengli talked about the importance of strategic firm points in December 2016, during an event commemorating the one-eighth anniversary of China ’ s anti-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa. Wu Shengli pointed out that “ oversea strategic strong compass point construction has provided a new support for escort operations… We must give full meet to the supporting function of the abroad support system to carry out larger scale missions in broader areas and to shape the situation. ” [5]
Establishing several strategic firm points near crisis regions is integral to ensuring the sustained and effective use of forces in these roles. [6] When incidents and crises erupted in the past, efforts to protect China ’ mho abroad interests were highly reactive. Strategic impregnable points allow China to gradually shift its carriage to stabilize and control situations before they become crises. They might even play a function in stabilizing local governments and economies, and in ensuring civil order ( International Herald Tribune, October 13 2015 ) .
Accurate and seasonably news is full of life to effective operations, and PLA thinkers believe that strategic hard points will serve intelligence patronize functions. [7] Two authors from the PLA Equipment Academy write about the PLAN ’ s exploitation of a “ ocean & space battlefield versatile site picture ” that integrates diverse news sources to provide real-time visualize data support for the PLAN ’ s abroad actions. This system, they submit, will support the PLAN ’ s defensive strategy in its strategic strong points, maritime passages, and core interest areas ( Journal of Equipment Academy, April 2017 ).
One Is Not Enough
The 2013 Science of Military Strategy declared that China “ must build oversea strategic strong points that depend on the fatherland, radiate into the surrounding areas, and move toward the two oceans. ” The “ two oceans ” refer to the Pacific Ocean and the indian Ocean. chinese sources intelligibly place an emphasis on the indian Ocean, across which extends China ’ s most significant SLOC : frequently called China ’ south “ lifeline ” ( shengming xian, 生命线 ), this SLOC runs from the mainland across the South China Sea, and through the Malacca Strait into the indian Ocean. There are two primary straits at the conclusion of this lifeline : the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz ( Grand Strategies for Strengthening the state : research on the Forefront Issues of National Strategy, June 2016 ). Securing the end of this lifeline is China ’ s first gear abroad strategic firm bespeak, the PLAN support base in Djibouti ( World Affairs, July 26, 2017 ) .
The Maritime Silk Road follows China ’ randomness lifeline through the indian Ocean, connecting the ports of many of the countries along this route. The secretary general of the China Port Association explains that taiwanese port companies are expanding their investment layout overseas through mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and other methods. These ports are referred to as crucial nodes for constructing the Maritime Silk Road ( China Ports, July 2018 ). According to an expert from the dalian Naval Academy, each of these nodes can potentially be transformed into a strategic impregnable indicate ( Ocean Development and Management, January 2016 ) .
chinese strategists besides view the PLAN ’ s island bases in the South China Sea ( SCS ) as strategic solid points, and believe that a network of mutually-supporting strategic strong points will help China secure the SCS leg of its maritime lifeline. The PRC established and expanded Sansha City in the Paracels in 2012, and began constructing artificial islands in the Spratlys in 2013 ( China Ocean Press, December 5, 2016 ; China News Weekly, May 12, 2016 ). Authors from the PLA and government-sponsored institutes describe these efforts as the construction of strategic strong points meant to strengthen China ’ sulfur position in the SCS .
Three authors from the dalian Naval Academy discuss the strategic logic of build this network in the SCS, and the confirm that these island points might offer for the PLAN ’ sulfur operations along the Maritime Silk Road ( Proceedings from the 8th Maritime Power Strategy Forum, October 21, 2016 ). Figure 1 (below) shows their depiction of the mesh nature of strategic strong points in the South China Sea .
Linked to the PRC mainland, this network of strategic solid points is intended to secure a military presence on the easterly entrance to the Malacca Strait. With the Djibouti naval foundation in place, China has secured a military presence on the far end of its lifeline. however, the PLAN has not been sufficiently engaged on the western capture to the Malacca Strait, and many chinese analysts believe that this is the coherent future step ( The New Orient, September 23, 2014 ). [8]
discussion of the strategic strong point concept is not confined to the amerind Ocean and the SCS. other authoritative sources have recently used the terminus in a grand context, citing the expansion of China ’ sulfur interests globally ( World Affairs, June 2018 ). indeed, the deputy director of the Center for National Strategic Research at the chinese Academy of Governance advocates the build of numerous strategic strong points across multiple regions ( administrative reform, June 2016 ). For example, some propose building a similar network of strategic strong points in the South Pacific ( Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making, No. 2, 2017 ), stating that the control of strategic hard points in these areas can help relieve strategic pressure from maritime challenges closer to home in the SCS ( Ministry of Commerce, May 23, 2017 ) .
however, there presently exists a wide gap in strategic hard point coverage of China ’ randomness lifeline across the northerly amerind Ocean between Djibouti and the SCS, making this area the stream priority. In the northerly indian Ocean, the ports of Gwadar ( Pakistan ) and Hambantota ( Sri Lanka ) are frequently cited as candidates to become future strategic strong points ( Reformation & Strategy, March 2017 ). Gwadar is well-positioned to cover the Strait of Hormuz, a key passage for Chinese energy imports ; whereas Hambantota provides an excellent indian Ocean mid-transit sharpen for refilling, compensate, and moor ( China Water Transport, December 2015 ) .
Creating an Overseas Support System
chinese strategists are already discussing the necessitate to integrate individual strategic strong points into an overseas defend system. The need to connect individual “ points ” ( dian, 点 ) into “ lines ” ( xian, 线 ) is a coarse theme in discussions about strategic strong points ( administrative reform, June 2016 ). Officers from the PLAN Command College describe a future basing layout that “ combines points and lines ” and “ controls chokepoints. ” [9] chinese experts besides point out that these lines should finally combine to form “ fronts ” ( mian, 面 ) ( Proceedings from the 8th Maritime Power Strategy Forum, October 21, 2016 ) .
staff at the Dalian Naval Academy have explained the functions of strategic hard points in what they refer to as the “ Points, Lines, and Fronts Strategy for ‘ Maritime Silk Road ’ Strategic Strong Point Construction ” ( Proceedings from the 8th Maritime Power Strategy Forum, October 21, 2016 ). This concept is illustrated in Figure 2 (below).
(Original graphic modified to provide author’s translation of the original Chinese)
The subject of “ fronts ” is presently unclear and reasonably sensitive. Some discussions of a mutually supporting network of strategic hard points intentionally avoid drawing connections between each point, fearing that doing so could raise fears about China ’ second grand ambitions. As one writer from the Institute of Strategic and Security Studies at the PLA ’ s National Defense University explains, the relationship between “ points ” and “ fronts ” in strategic hard compass point construction must be by rights managed to reduce the risk of sparking alarm clock among extraneous observers and host-states, who might interpret such expansion negatively. China must realistically plan numerous “ points, ” but only let some of them “ bloom. ” Some can make developmental breakthroughs, but multiple “ lines ” should not coincide with each other. The most strategically valuable strategic potent points must be developed first. [10]
If such an approach is ultimately adopted, it is likely that we are witnessing an initial period of rapid strategic strong point construction. What follows may be a gradual festering of civilian port infrastructure into a more robust logistics documentation network–one located along the mid-section of the lifeline route, which will link up with locations in the South China Sea .
Conclusions
This article has attempted to answer some critical questions about China ’ s approach to developing its overseas military accompaniment capabilities. Tracking chinese discussion on strategic strong points can shed ignite on the PRC ’ s intent to establish an oversea military presence. significantly, the term demonstrates a relationship between the seem unrelated military facilities that the PRC has constructed in the Horn of Africa and the South China Sea. Academic discussions on strategic strong points are widespread, and there are numerous taiwanese experts exploring this subject on two levels. many probe in-depth the function of strategic strong points in supporting chinese sea power ( Journal of International Security Studies, February 2015 ). however, there is besides a outgrowth of discourse that utilizes the term as an option concept to an confederation : scholarly discussions of strategic solid points in this context frequently advocate that China loosen, but not abandon, its non-alliance policy ( Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, No. 1, 2014 ) .
Beijing has sought to minimize the security dimensions of its Belt and Road scheme in order to mitigate negative press coverage regarding the PRC ’ s future geopolitical intentions ( China Defense News, May 5, 2017 ). however, the far-flung use of the term “ strategic strong points ” appears to have successfully allowed an overt discussion since 2013 of China ’ mho construction of oversea military presence and free-base, while inactive allowing the PRC to posture itself as a more virtuous international actor than the rapacious imperial powers of the past. Understanding the terms and concepts of this discussion will prove fundamental to assessing future taiwanese naval strategy .
Conor Kennedy is an Instructor at the China Maritime Studies Institute of the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He received his MA from the Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies.
Notes
[1] The term “ strategic strong target ” is besides frequently written as 战略支撑点 (zhanlüe zhichengdian), used interchangeably. See : 王多月 [ Wang Duoyue ], “ 战略支撑点与 ‘ 21世纪海上丝绸之路 ’ 的建设 ” [ Strategic Pivot Countries and the Construction of the ‘ Maritime Silk Road ’ in 21st Century ], May 20, 2017, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, p. 27 .
[2] 李大光 [ Li Daguang ], “ 关岛基地 : 美军西太军事要塞 ” [ Guam Base : The US Military ’ s Fortress in the Western Pacific ], 当代海军 [ Navy Today ], No. 2, 2016, pp. 60-62 ; 杨燕南 [ Yang Yan ’ nan ], “ 迪戈加西亚 : 美军印度洋上不沉的 ‘ 航母 ‘ ” [ Diego Garcia : US military ’ s unsinkable ‘ Aircraft Carrier ’ in the indian Ocean ], 当代海军 [ Navy Today ], No. 7, 2016, pp. 52-55 .
[3] 许可 [ Xu Ke ], “ 构建 ‘ 海上丝路 ’ 上的战略支点 ” [ On the Establishment of Strategic Fulcrums for the twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road : A address of Diego Garcia Base for China ], 亚太安全与海洋研究 [ Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs ], No. 5 2016, p. 13 .
[4] 王滨 [ Wang Bin ], “ 护航行动海外保障点建设思考 ” [ Thoughts on the Construction of Overseas Support Points for Escort Operations ], 海军杂志 [ Navy Magazine ], No. 12, 2010, p. 2 .
[5] Commander Wu Shengli ’ s master quote : “ 海外战略支点建设为护航行动提供了新支撑。我们必须充分发挥海外保障体系的支撑作用，以便在更大范围、更广领域遂行任务、塑造态势. ” See : 梁庆松 [ Liang Qingsong ], 王元元 [ Wang Yuanyuan ], “ 海军召开亚丁湾护航8周年研讨会 ” [ The Navy Holds a Seminar on the 8th Anniversary of the Gulf of Aden Escorts ], 人民海军 [ People ’ s Navy ], December 30, 2016, p. 1 .
[6] Xu Ke, p. 12 .
[7] Ibid.
[8] Xu Ke, p. 10 .
[9] The original Chinese for the idiom describing China ’ s basing layout is “ 点线结合、控制咽喉、依托城市、重在长远. ” See : 谌力, 汪丽, 韦政 [ Chen Li, Wang Li, Wei Zheng ], “ 新安全观视域下海外基地转型重塑的影响及启示 ” [ The Impact and Lessons of the Transformation and Reconstruction of Overseas Military Bases Under the New Security Concept ], 国防 [ National Defense ], No. 9, 2017, pp. 41-45 .
[10] Original Chinese is “ 可以多点运筹, 但不宜全面开花 ; 适宜重点突破, 不能多线并进. ” See : 胡欣 [ Hu Xin ], “ 中国的海外战略支点建设需要处理好五对关系 ” [ China ’ second Construction of Overseas Strategic Strong Points Must Deal with Five Relationships ], 世界知识 [ World Affairs ], No. 3, 2018, p. 74 .