A Transatlantic Approach to Address Growing Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea

February 1, 2021 The recent news headline said it all : “ Pirates kidnap 15 turkish sailors in attack on container embark ” off the nigerian slide in the Gulf of Guinea. A huge nautical partition of 2.3 million square kilometers and 5700 kilometers of coastline with considerable economic wealth, the Gulf of Guinea has recently been plagued by a succession of acts of piracy, making this maritime outer space one of the most dangerous and unstable in the world .
While Europe and the United States have been engaged in the region for many years, this deteriorating security situation requires renewed transatlantic date. In a context of reprise calls for a renewed partnership between Washington and Europe, the Gulf of Guinea could be a prime campaigner for demonstrating the benefits of transatlantic collaboration .

A Strategic Area

Encompassing 17 countries from Senegal to Angola, the Gulf of Guinea is high endowed with huge reserves of hydrocarbon, mineral ( diamond, tin and cobalt ), and fisheries resources, making it a strategic area. While not a major international transport route, the Gulf of Guinea represents 25 percentage of african nautical traffic and has closely 20 commercial seaports.

With 60 percentage of Africa ‘s vegetable oil production, the Gulf of Guinea is home to 4.5 percentage of the world ‘s raise oil reserves and 2.7 percentage of prove natural gas reserves. Two-thirds of these reserves are concentrated within the single economic zone of Nigeria, the center of graveness of the area, whose oil sector accounts for 75 percentage of the state ‘s gross and 90 percentage of total exports. The Gulf of Guinea besides has one of the world ‘s richest fishing grounds and represents about 4 percentage of ball-shaped fish production. The fisheries sector is a critical generator of use for millions of people. In West Africa alone, up to a quarter of jobs are linked to the fisheries sector .
These resources contribute to the economic vigor of the area, and its economic electric potential is expected to increase in the coming years ( the area will comprise a quarter of the earth ‘s population by 2050 ). But before it can realize and benefit from this potential, threats to its stability and prosperity must first be addressed .

A Confluence of Threats

The area ‘s maritime affluence has attracted non-state actors, who lack economic opportunities elsewhere, to engage in illicit natural process which is fueled by regional corruption, high levels of unemployment, and a miss of effective administration .
According to the International Maritime Bureau, the number of kidnappings at sea reported in this region increased by 40 percentage between 2019 and 2020, with the Gulf accounting for approximately 95 percentage of global kidnappings. The Gulf of Guinea has consequently overtaken the Gulf of Aden and Somalia as the leading ball-shaped piracy hot spot. In 2019, 111 acts of piracy were counted, compared to 25 in the amerind Ocean. A decline in oil prices and a general shift from hijacking for cargo larceny to kidnapping for ransom has occurred in holocene years. In 2019, 146 people were kidnapped, compared to 60 in 2017 .
Another generator of attraction is illegal, unreported, and unregulated ( IUU ) fish, which amounts to up to 65 percentage of the legally reported catch, the highest level globally. Representing an annual passing of $ 1.5 billion for local governments, this illegal fish contributes to the scarcity of fishery resources and far accentuates social and economic tensions in the region .
These concerns accentuate the already rampant sum of multinational illicit trafficking found in the Gulf of Guinea. Fuel and unrefined oil larceny and smuggling are major problems in Nigeria, where an estimated 120,000 barrels of crude anoint are stolen each day, or about 6 percentage of Nigeria ’ randomness output signal. Facilitated by holey down borders, corruption, and inadequate maritime security enforcement, illegitimate trade in drugs, arms, and even persons is besides escalating in the region. The Gulf of Guinea has besides become a major theodolite point for multinational drug cartels from Latin America, with roughly 25 to 35 percentage of all Andean cocaine consumed in Europe passing through West Africa .

International Cooperation as an Answer

This concourse of threats mobilized the international community in the early on 2010s. Under the auspices of the United Nations, 17 riparian countries gathered at the Yaoundé Summit in 2013 and established a modern nautical security architecture. Based on regional coordination centers ( in Abidjan, Pointe-Noire, and Yaoundé ), this computer architecture seeks to create shared maritime knowledge domain awareness among regional states through enhanced information-sharing .
The implementation of this architecture has received particular political and fiscal support from the external community, starting with the European Union, which has 400,000 nationals in the region and imports 13 percentage of its anoint consumption from there. Composed of the G7 countries and other like-minded countries and organizations, the G7++ Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea has besides played a call up function since its origin in 2013 .
Given the very limited resources of local navies, particularly in terms of vessels adequate to of function on the high seas, the European and American navies have besides been immediately engaged in the area. Maritime assets are regularly deployed to the Gulf of Guinea, performing assorted missions ranging from training local navies to anti-piracy operations.

France has a long-standing commitment in the region with pre-positioned forces in Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Gabon, and a permanent bearing at ocean since the 1990s through “ Operation Corymbe. ” Deploying one or two ships in the Gulf, the french Navy per annum organizes three to four regional exercises, culminating in a major annual use called Grand African Navy ‘s exercise for Maritime Operations ( NEMO ). The 2020 NEMO exert brought together 30 ships and aircraft from 14 nations, with the participation of the United States .
early european countries are besides actively engaged in the Gulf of Guinea, due to historical and economic links with the region. Portugal and Spain ensure a significant bearing at ocean, while early countries, such as Italy, the United Kingdom, or Belgium occasionally deploy their navies. Given the importance of its shipping industry ( which is responsible for more than 10 percentage of the global transport ), Denmark is besides increasingly engaged in the region, notably through capacity-building efforts .
particularly concerned by the destabilize affect of maritime insecurity centered on Nigeria, the United States has besides maintained a nautical presence under the assurance of U.S. Africa Command ( AFRICOM ), which regularly deploys warships in the region and organizes a major annual exercise called Obangame Express. As co-chair in 2020 of the G7++, Washington plays an active diplomatic role in the region and has provided substantial confirm bilaterally to local navies .

The Case for a Smarter Transatlantic Cooperation

Regional and external efforts remain insufficient, as witnessed in the most holocene, high-visibility plagiarism attacks. Addressing increase nautical insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea will require stronger transatlantic cooperation, leveraging the deployment of barely naval assets and countering the increase influence of competitors in the region such as China .
Washington and Europe should build on the achievements of their anti-piracy efforts off the slide of Somalia, which serve as a casebook case for effective multinational coordination, while adapting their scheme to the specificities of the Gulf of Guinea. Compared to the Horn of Africa, plagiarism attacks in the Gulf of Guinea are occurring largely in territorial waters and not in an international and undisciplined quad, therefore requiring locally owned solutions. Against this backdrop, a transatlantic answer should focus on the adopt objectives .
Complete the Yaoundé security architecture. While the Yaoundé process has made initial build up, this architecture remains incomplete, due to the absence of an appropriate legislative and judicial framework, which makes enforcing the rule of law in the Gulf of Guinea about impossible. With the help of the G7++, riparian countries should ensure extradition or common legal aid while closing existing police enforcement loopholes exploited by understanding criminals to evade pursuance. Members of the G7++ should besides work towards a broader vision of maritime stability, notably by orienting part of their aid to address the autochthonal problems of corruptness, weak rule of law, and economic and social excommunication .
Strengthen jointly the capacity of local navies. haunting imbalance in the Gulf of Guinea besides hinges on the express capacities of local navies or slide guards which are under-equipped to provide a credible disincentive, specially beyond their territorial waters. The United States and Europeans would benefit from greater coordination of their efforts to train and provide equipment to local navies, whether vessels or nautical surveillance platforms ( for example, radar, drones ). Greater alignment between Washington and Europe will serve as a buffet to China ’ south increased capacity-building aid in the region. Beijing has delivered advanced patrol boats and vessels to Gulf of Guinea navies, well strengthening its influence in the area .
Establish a coordinated maritime presence. last, the United States and Europe should ensure better coordination of their deploy navies and slide guards which typically operate in analogue, reducing their affect and leading to repetitive or unnecessary discipline provisions. Because of their limited naval assets, Europeans have begun to lay the basis for a more coherent employment of their navies under the european Union-led “ Coordinated Maritime Presences ” first step. Designed to leverage the presence of european national naval assets through enhanced information-sharing, this mechanism will be first base tested in the Gulf of Guinea in close coordination with external and local partners, and will be among the priorities of the Portuguese presidency of the European Union ( January–June 2021 ). This inaugural could lay crucial basis for increased cooperation between U.S. and european navies on trainings, planned deployments, or logistic back .
While the Gulf of Guinea may not be at the top of the transatlantic “ disturbance ” tilt for the Biden administration, the region remains a strategic area whose growing instability has larger global consequences which require sustained international mobilization. The Gulf of Guinea could be an crucial and early exemplar of a partner-led and U.S. enabled model where Europe increases its function as a security provider with accompaniment from the United States to address a growing security challenge.

Pierre Morcos is a visiting boyfriend with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) in Washington, D.C .
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