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China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas

Maritime disputes constitute the single likeliest beginning of imbalance and military conflict with China, says Michael Swaine. In testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, he explains the primary drivers of latent hostility in the East and South China Seas and identifies steps Washington can take to reduce the risk of hostilities .

Policy Recommendations:

    • Support a code of conduct: Washington should strongly encourage development of a binding code of conduct governing behavior in contested waters.

 

    • Pursue quiet diplomacy: The United States should engage in a sustained diplomatic campaign emphasizing close personal interactions with all parties and a low public profile.

 

    • Encourage joint development of resources: Washington should encourage the establishment of a multinational joint venture capable of adjudicating exploration rights and addressing environmental concerns.

 

  • Maintain perspective: The United States should keep maritime disputes in perspective, recognizing their deep historical roots and resisting the temptation to view them as a barometer of the U.S.-China strategic relationship.

Swaine concludes, “ There is no flying fasten or silver fastball for resolving these complex and longstanding maritime disputes. It will require solitaire, sustained campaign, and a very deft hand on the share of the United States. ”

Full Testimony

Introduction

China ’ sulfur disputes with other states over territorial reign and resource claims in the East and South China Seas constitute one of three relate but distinct categories of nautical disputes or sets of concerns between Beijing and other nations .
apart from the Taiwan offspring ( which is arguably a maritime challenge of sorts, but not the focus of this earshot ), maritime sovereignty and resource disputes center on ( a ) the Sino-Japanese imbroglio concerning both overlapping maritime resource claims and autonomous manipulate over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands northeast of Taiwan, and ( bel ) the complex web of disputes between Beijing and several Southeast asian entities ( Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan ) over many islands, atolls, reefs, and shoals in the South China Sea.

A second located of disputes centers on the activities of naval military operations within China ’ s Exclusive Economic Zone ( EEZ ) and non-demarcated “ near sea ” ( jinhai ), including U.S. Navy ISR operations and exercises along China ’ s coastline, allied concerns over PLAN naval transits and the growing PLAN presence in sensitive waters near other states, and contending interpretations of the rights of extraneous navies to operate in EEZs, as defined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS ) .
On the broadest level, a third fix of concerns ( they have not however risen to the level of an active quarrel, constituting rather an escalate competition ) is more strategic in nature, affecting the stallion area of the alleged “ foremost island chain ” stretching from Japan to Southeast Asia. They derive from the contradiction between a long-standing american presumption of the need to maintain military domination across the Western Pacific and the recently emerging chinese capability to challenge certain elements of that domination, largely through the deployment of increasingly capable “ counter-intervention ” or anti-access, area-denial ( A2/AD ) -type weapons systems along China ’ s nautical periphery .
This contradiction to some extent underlies and sharpens the above two categories of disputes by placing them in a larger strategic context involving the shifting balance of exponent in the Western Pacific. That is, nautical disputes in the early two narrower areas take on a academic degree of likely strategic significance because many observers view them as possible indicators of this shifting military symmetry. In especial, the increasing capabilities and resolve that Beijing is displaying in its disputes with the U.S. and other nations over the above two sets of nautical issues are viewed as an indirect challenge to the overall nautical status quo as defined largely by Washington .
Taken as a whole, these nautical issues are vitally important because they constitute the single most likely and meaning electric potential generator of instability, and even military conflict, with China over both the cheeseparing and at least the medium ( if not the long ) term. furthermore, such dangers—and particularly those associated with the disputes in the East and South China Seas—are particularly acute as a leave of the affair of impregnable ( and apparently rising ) nationalist emotions on all sides, and the overall zero-sum nature of the sovereignty issues involved, which inclines claimants to adopt absolutist stances and in many instances over-react to perceived challenges to one ’ s military position .
As the dominant allele maritime world power in the Western Pacific, with a strong commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the region, and as an asian power with particular political, economic, and security relations with two regional allies involved in the above disputes ( Japan and the Philippines ), the United States is fated to play a major character in managing these volatile issues. indeed, in late years, Washington has taken a much more active and direct character in the maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas .
In arrange to contribute to the effective management of these disputes, and of China ’ randomness role in finical, it is vitally crucial for Washington to understand clearly their origins and drivers, specially in the shell of China, a well as the limits, strengths, and dangers of respective types of possible future U.S. responses. The trace sections will address these issues, and specifically answer several of the questions posed by the Commission .

General Origins and Drivers

As suggested above, many factors are acting to intensify the nautical disputes in the East and South China Seas. While some of these are immediately associated with China, others are not. The most China-centric drivers include : Beijing ’ s overall increasing regional baron and influence on one bridge player ; and arguably intensify levels of taiwanese nationalism and the related affect of social media—such as blogs and messaging via smart phones—among the chinese populace on the early hand .
Regarding the former, in holocene years, Beijing has significantly increased its capacity to operate both military and non-military ( or para-military ) naval and air assets along its littoral, thereby enhancing its ability to assert its long-standing and largely unchanged claims, through a greater overall maritime presence and an increased ability to police challenge areas and react to the actions of others. Although other claimants are besides striving to increase their capacities in a similar manner, Beijing has frankincense far arguably been the most successful, in big part due to its growing economic capability .
The latter driver of chinese demeanor ( i.e., social media ) has served to intensify and expand the public ’ second awareness, in real meter, of apparent challenges or demeanor by other states to chinese sovereignty claims, thereby placing greater press on the chinese leadership to respond cursorily and decisively. chinese citizens hear about sovereignty-related incidents soon after they occur, exchange responses with one another through social media in ways that frequently escalate exponentially in very rapid fashion, and often make excessive and sometimes farcical demands of the PRC politics. Although Beijing is by no means a passive recipient of such pressures, it is arguably awful of appearing weak or inactive in the side of such impregnable public opinion .
The saturation of the taiwanese reception to sovereignty-related challenges or issues is reinforced by the emotional association of those issues with the violations of China ’ s reign that occurred during China ’ s alleged “ Century of Humiliation ” at the hands of foreigners ( extending from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries ), and the fact that China ’ s collective leadership in general is arguably more concerned today with prototype concerns and populace pressures than in the past. Add to this the increasing level of strategic distrust existing between Washington and Beijing, which fuel chinese suspicions of U.S. manipulation of these disputes, and the consequence is an acuate level of concern and a leaning toward over-reaction on the part of both taiwanese leaders and general public. Of course, patriotism, social media, and historic experiences besides affect the behavior of early claimants. But taiwanese pride and resentment, and the diaphanous size of China ’ second population, makes China ’ s behavior particularly celebrated and acute .
other factors that are contributing to the growing saturation of nautical reign disputes include an overall drift among regional states in general to pay greater care to the actual or potential resource benefits existing within contested maritime areas, the greater economic and hence military and para-military capacity of the participants, and the overall greater attention paid to external ( as opposed to domestic ) security challenges by many claimants. All this suggests that the changing nature of East Asia societies and economies to some extent drives the growing activism of all claimants .
last, another set of factors that drive both assertive demeanor and fearful concerns among the claimants in maritime disputes is the doubt created by America ’ s current economic and political problems. For many Asians, the possibility of an America in decline leads to a interrogate of the sustainability and potency of U.S. military might in the Western Pacific and possibly, in the case of China, an effort to push bet on more energetically against what is perceived as a growing american english try to contain Beijing, in character through Washington ’ s greater engagement in maritime disputes .
This doubt, along with Washington ’ south avowed desire to pay greater attention to the Asia-Pacific area, besides increases incentives among those asian nations contending with China in maritime disputes to draw the U.S. more actively into those disputes on their english. This is inevitable to some extent, at least with attentiveness to the U.S. allies involved. But such a moral force can besides worsen the situation if improperly handled .

How Does China’s Behavior Differ?

As the above suggests, the increasing blueprint of assertiveness witnessed in maritime disputes occurring in the East and South China Seas is separate of a competitive active among all the states involved. Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, and China have all engaged in highly assertive demeanor in late years, either independently of actions taken by others, or in apparent reception to perceived “ provocations. ” These actions include the passing of new domestic laws and regulations of relevance, the establishment of new administrative entities, the populace submission of more intelligibly defined claims ( normally in answer to external bodies ), increased attempts to explore for or extract both oceanic and energy resources in challenge waters, the increase detention of fishermen, provocative statements by officials, apparent attempts to alter the legal status or depiction of disputed territories, and overall increases in the oscilloscope and/or frequency of patrols. many of these activities are listed in the table below, supplied by Taylor Fravel .
These and other actions have at times led to an increased reliance on coercion, bullying, and the practice of force, along with more absolutist, incendiary, and provocative palaver by some of the claimants. In late years, China in particular has engaged in some forms of both types of behavior. Of course, from Beijing ’ s perspective, much of its demeanor has been in reply to what it views as distinctly provocative actions taken by others, either to alter the status quo or to depart from previously agreed upon ways of managing a long-standing dispute .
This might indeed be true in several cases. furthermore, there is little evidence that China has altered either its basic national security strategy in Asia or its core policy toward maritime disputes. It remains supportive of a scheme designed to ensure regional peace and development, requiring efforts to limit and control disputes through negotiation, confirm or deepen respective forms of cooperation with neighbors, and broadly invalidate conflict. At the same clock time, it seeks to maintain what it regards as a necessity and unhesitating defense against perceived attempts by others to undermine China ’ s diplomatic, legal, political, economic, and military position involving maritime and other sovereignty disputes .
These twin objectives obviously exist in some latent hostility with one another ( i, the latter finish can frequently require, from Beijing ’ s position, actions that undermine the former goal ). indeed, while normally professing a hope to avoid confrontation and conflict, Beijing often resorts to language and behavior toward maritime disputes that is excessively emotional and escalatory. This has been particularly discernible in the current crisis with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, where Beijing at times hire incendiary speech and is clearly engaged in an feat to compel Japan to acknowledge the universe of a challenge over the issue and accept in some means China ’ s affirmation of administrative authority over the islands .
In such efforts, Beijing seems to adopt the view that it must “ make up lost ground ” or “ end unacceptable practices once and for all ” in order to prevent an erosion of its placement. In general, this vantage point apparently results in efforts to defend against future challenges to its claims and strengthen its basic position by broadly increasing its overall ability to patrol and operate in disputed areas. All of this might be viewed by Beijing as defensive and precautionary, but many others view it differently .
indeed, China has a greater capability, and possibly a greater willingness than other claimants, to engage in escalatory or provocative actions, for several reasons. Some have already been mentioned, such as a strong and growing economy and a particular form of nationalism tinged with acerb historical memories. Others include a tendency to regard sovereignty disputes in moralistic terms—as issues of bare right and wrong, good and bad behavior—requiring an uncompromising position. Yet others include a crisis management approach that emphasizes signaling potent resoluteness, creating grim momentum, responding in a fixed “ tit-for-tat ” manner, and in some cases acting before a window of opportunity closes or a window of vulnerability opens .
All of these features, reinforced by the hypothesis of unsealed manipulate over a multitude of local actors ( for example, petroleum companies, fishermen, scientists, nautical jurisprudence enforcement agencies, local governments, and the military ) can explain to a great extent why Beijing, among many assertive actors, seems prone to a particularly strong imprint of assertive and at times irregular behavior. That said, it is significant to keep in take care that Beijing makes a firm distinction between civilian and military instruments in addressing territorial disputes. Although the military normally serves as a ( often distant ) backstop for the actions of civilian nautical agencies, China ’ s “ gray-hulled ” naval ships do not become directly involved in disputes. For the Chinese, such involvement stands as a de facto red note for all sides involved .

How does China demonstrate and enforce its maritime territorial claims? What role does the PLA Navy play in China’s approach to its maritime conflicts? How does that differ from the role of Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies?

To enforce its claims, Beijing chiefly employs a growing number of non-military naval ships and some aircraft variously attached to its alleged five-spot Dragons. These include the Border Control Department ’ s China Maritime Police, the Maritime Safety Administration, the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command or FLEC ( under the Fisheries Administration Bureau ), and the General Administration of Customs and the State Oceanic Administration ( particularly its China Maritime Surveillance means, or CMS ). Among these entities, the FLEC and CMS possess the most vessels, with around forty over 1,000 tons. A small minority of these vessels are obviously armed with big machine guns. however, both agencies have besides reportedly received a few decommission warships, with uncertain ( if any ) armament. Overall, the CMS, the most adequate to enforcement entity regarding nautical issues, intends to add 36 new ships in the 600-, 1,000-, and 1,500-ton class by 2015 .
These ships undertake a variety show of operations, including patrol, exercising, escorting fishing fleets, and responding to perceived violations of claim territories and waters under chinese authority .
In addition, China ’ s boastfully fleet of fish vessels often serves to demonstrate China ’ s claim to maritime areas by operational in challenge waters. These fishing vessels for the most part operate seasonally and apparently not always under the control of a coordinating representation.

The PLA Navy ( PLAN ) does not take a direct role in enforcing China ’ second maritime territorial claims. As bespeak above, Beijing draws a hard note between civilian and military entities in managing such claims, with the early “ white-hulled ” vessels of the CMS and FLEC playing the lead character. PLAN warships at times provide “ stand-off ” back during actions that could escalate. however, the overall purpose is to avoid militarizing disputes, unless of course an opposition employs military assets. In such a case, Beijing will about surely respond similarly, in a classic “ tit-for-tat ” manner .
Some plan vessels have been involved in joint civilian-military maritime exercises in the vicinity of challenge areas, although these activities much focus on non-belligerent missions such as salvage or search and rescue .

How has China’s approach to the East and South China Seas disputes changed in recent years? When did that change in approach take place, and why did it take place? How, if at all, has it changed since the “Fifth Generation” of Chinese leaders assumed power?

Since approximately 2007, Beijing has undertaken a variety of greater actions to reinforce and assert its claims, including increases in the numbers of vessels and frequency of patrols and aim exercises, the universe of new administrative entities and the natural elevation of existing entities, the announcement of parcels for development in disputed waters, the cut of seismic towed arrays by another claimant, efforts to create a new status quo in particular cases by taking control of one land feature ( Scarborough Shoal ) and undertaking nourish incursions into the nearby airspace and waters of a disputed group of islands ( Senkaku/Diaoyu islands ), and a diverseness of diplomatic and not-so-diplomatic actions, from demarches to the submission of formal explanations or claims to external bodies and the equalization of threats or warnings against extraneous oil companies .
This general convention of increased bodily process has occurred in ebb and flows, with particularly intense periods in 2008, leap 2011, spring/summer 2012, and at present, over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands .
The chief cause of most ( but not all ) of China ’ s increased bodily process has been the actions of other claimants, combined with Beijing ’ mho increased overall capacity to place assets in challenge areas. As Taylor Fravel, myself, and other analysts have pointed out, China ’ s more assertive actions have been largely contribution of an interactional dynamic among respective claimants ( including most notably Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan, in summation to China ) .
For example, Fravel states :
[ China ’ second ] diplomatic demarches to foreign oil companies in 2006 and 2007….responded to increased vietnamese exploration in waters that China claims. Likewise, the dramatic increase in the detention of vietnamese fishing boats in 2009 coincides with an increased presence of vietnamese ships in the waters around the Paracels, frequently within the territorial seas that China claims around these islands. The June 2012 announcement by CNOOC of new blocks in challenge parts of the South China Sea was likely a response to Vietnam ’ s maritime jurisprudence. The June 2012 bureaucratic elevation of “ Sansha ” from county to a prefectural-level city was besides probably a response to what China viewed as Philippine and vietnamese efforts to strengthen their own claims .
source : Taylor Fravel, “ Growing Competition in the South China Sea, ” unpublished paper .
The attach mesa, listing the major actions taken by China, Vietnam, and the Philippines in the South China Sea in the past few years, confirms the interactivity of territorial disputes and the reactive nature of assertive policies by claimant states .
Although normally intended as a kind of “ tit-for-tat ” response, as indicated above, in some instances Beijing has responded in a measuredly escalatory manner, seeking to create a new condition quo in its favor or to undertake a more muscular or aggressive action in regulate to convey decide and deter foster escalations by others. Examples of such behavior include the cable cutting incident in May 2011, the seizure of Scarborough Shoal in April 2012, the announcement of exploration blocks in June 2012, and the initiation of regular incursions into the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands region in October 2012 .
Some analysts believe that these and other actions are part of an overall debate Chinese scheme to utilize sensed provocations in order to justify pre-planned actions to change the condition quo. This suggests that Beijing might even create incidents to strengthen its claims. however, this interpretation of Beijing ’ s behavior lacks conclusive evidence at give and thus remains a guess at best. An evenly plausible alternative explanation is that China largely reacts to perceived attempts by others ( e.g., Manila and Tokyo ) to alter the status quo by itself establishing a new condition quo .
In any consequence, it is important to keep in mind that, at least in the South China Sea, as Fravel observes, “ …the level of tension…has not so far reached the instability that the area witnessed from 1988 to 1995. … In particular, the dispute has not so far been militarized. Claimants have not resorted to the use of force and the menace of force has normally been indirect. ”
Speculation abounds concerning the impingement of Xi Jinping and the new leadership on the above moral force. It is possible that Xi has exerted a major influence on China ’ s handling thus far of both the Scarborough Shoal and Senkaku/Diaoyu islands incidents. Since at least mid-2012, he apparently has served as the major elder member of two supervision bodies, one formed to deal with maritime security issues in general and the other the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands crisis in particular. According to some analysts, Xi personally approved a bit-by-bit design to intensify pressure on Japan, thereby rejecting a more moderate approach advocated by some in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Others point to Xi ’ s past experience with the PLA, his celebrated PLA wife ( a long-familiar singer of patriotic songs ), his betrothal of the “ China Dream ” concept that allegedly envisions a solid state with a strong military, and his high-profile visits to military facilities to support the notion that the new leadership will employ a far more mesomorphic, military-oriented foreign policy under his leadership, particularly toward maritime and other sovereignty disputes. At salute, however, this general conclusion is largely bad, another matter to guess that awaits more conclusive tell .

How does China’s approach to the East China Sea dispute differ from its approach to the South China Sea dispute?

As indicated above, in both the Scarborough Shoal and Senkaku/Diaoyu islands incidents, Beijing responded to a perceive effort to violate an existing status quo by establishing a newfangled condition quo. In the former, the Philippines was seen to be altering its past approach by dispatching a naval warship to the area and by apparently arresting chinese fishermen inside the school. China ’ randomness leaders likely viewed such actions as part of a broader convention of escalatory behavior undertaken by Manila since at least mid-2011 ( see below table ). In the latter, Tokyo was perceived as altering the sovereignty condition of the islands by purchasing three of them from private owners. In accession, China ’ s overall position toward claim territories in both areas has been broadly similar, involving “ indisputable ” assertions of sovereign authority. besides, in enforcing its claim, China has employed primarily civilian assets in both cases, as described above .
That said, in the lawsuit of its East China Sea dispute with Japan, Beijing obviously is dealing with a more formidable opposition that enjoys very close political and military ties with Washington, including the nearby presence of U.S. forces. In the event of the South China Sea disputes, Beijing is facing several opponents with vastly weaker capabilities and reasonably differ approaches. One might think that these differences would lead Beijing to display greater caution in its approach to Tokyo. To some extent, this is probably the case. For example, it is highly improbable that Beijing will attempt to forcibly seize the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands absent a major perceived aggravation by Tokyo ( and even then, the likelihood of such an natural process is not guaranteed ). furthermore, Beijing has apparently closely controlled its incursions into quarrel waters and airspace in late months and avoided the most provocative behavior, such as an attempt to place personnel on any of the islands .
At the lapp time, Beijing ’ s “ restraint ” is counterbalanced, in the case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands crisis, by the depth of patriot antipathy toward Japan felt by many Chinese. This arguably inclines Beijing toward a level of inflammatory palaver and other “ ruffianly ” verbal postures broadly not apparent in the case of South China Sea disputes. This besides presents a greater hypothesis of Beijing falling into a more dangerous “ committedness trap ” vis-à-vis Japan in which it issues warnings or takes a position from which it is loath to retreat .

What are the prospects for a resolution of the East China Sea and South China Sea conflicts? Discuss possible roles for international institutions, such as the UN, and regional institutions, such as ASEAN.

The prospects over the short- to medium- term are not thoroughly. The combination of absolutist stances on sovereignty, intense nationalism, high public awareness, potentially major economic incentives, increasing civilian and military capabilities among the claimants, strategic calculations, and the absence of either clear and bind legal or early procedures or a supra-national authority to arbitrate or enforce disputes combine to prevent any significant drift toward any “ resolution. ” That said, a more stable basis for mediating and hence controlling disputes among the claimants is conceivably potential. All of the actors involved have an incentive to prevent an intense arms race or escalating design of confrontation and conflict over challenge maritime territories. In the shell of China, such outcomes would threaten its overall “ peace and development ” strategy and reinforce the impression that it is unwilling to develop or utilize legal procedures or norms to resolve differences with its neighbors .
International institutions such as the UN or ASEAN might play a greater function in encouraging a bind code of conduct or like specify of procedures or confidence build measures. however, this would require significant agreement among all the claimants to utilize such an approach. unfortunately, such unanimity does not exist, either within the ASEAN membership or between China and other claimants. Although committed to a bilateral approach path in negotiating any resolution of the conflicting territorial claims, Beijing is obviously volition to develop at some point a dressing code of lead to maintain constancy until a resolution is potential. little advancement has occurred in this campaign, however, largely because of differences within ASEAN and, more importantly, due to Beijing ’ s insistence that conditions for a bind code are “ not ripe, ” for a kind of reasons. Unless Beijing becomes convinced that moving toward a bind code of demeanor is preferable to the fluid status quo, build up will remain unlikely .

What roles should the U.S. play in reaching resolutions?

several U.S. interests are engaged on this issue, including the preservation of a peaceful security environment in Asia, the boost of predominate of law and the resolution of inter-state disputes through negotiation, and the maintenance of freedom of navigation. In protecting these interests, the U.S. besides has an interest in supporting its allies while avoiding actions that serve to exacerbate security contest and promote the emergence of a zero-sum security relationship with China. Advancing all of these interests simultaneously poses a significant challenge, specially during a period when Washington ’ sulfur capacity to influence events could be declining .
obviously, Washington should do its farthermost to encourage and support the existing feat to develop a tie down code of demeanor upon which all parties can agree. To do this, it needs to work with all sides to develop a process whereby China ’ randomness reservations and ASEAN ’ second differences can be addressed and resolved pace by tone. In this feat, it should avoid taking positions that appear to place it on one side or the other, as it has sometimes done in the past. In especial, attempts to encourage ASEAN states to develop greater oneness should be undertaken simultaneously with any interactions with China, in ordering to avoid the impression that Washington is focused on strengthening ASEAN ’ s ability to confront Beijing as a bloc. Washington must besides guard against the natural tendency of its allies to use its participation in these disputes to elicit the kind of subscribe that could exacerbate tensions or far polarization. U.S. officials are mindful of these issues, but awareness and behavior are not the same thing .
All of this will require free burning diplomacy through close, personal interactions with all parties, as opposed to casual statements and meetings conducted on a selective footing. In general, Washington should strive to keep a depleted public profile while working energetically on the individual flat .
In accession to efforts aimed at avoiding future incidents, Washington should besides encourage the joint development of resources in quarrel areas, possibly through the establishment of new entities and processes. For model, it should consider supporting the constitution of a type of multi-national joint venture with both legal and commercial elements, as recently advocated by Parag Khanna and John Gilman. As they state :
This special purpose vehicle would adjudicate the exploration rights of ships registered and recognized by it in order to continue to guarantee freedom of navigation and passage for shipping, while besides respecting environmental concerns with respect to economic development. Existing occupations of territories would not be forcibly overturned, but the sovereignty interview would be shelved for the meter being without recognizing or dismissing the claims of the current parties to the quarrel.

source : Parag Khanna and John Gilman, CNN Opinion, November 13, 2012, on hypertext transfer protocol : //www.cnn.com/2012/11/13/opinion/khanna-south-china-sea-dispute
There is no immediate fix or silver medal fastball for resolving these complex and long-standing nautical disputes. It will require solitaire, constraint, sustained campaign, and a very deft bridge player on the part of the United States. furthermore, in all of its efforts, Washington should strive to separate vitamin a much as possible these disputes from the larger question of its evolving strategic relationship with China. many members of the media and outside analysts make such connections on a regular footing, by viewing each american or chinese natural process with see to the disputes as an indicator of alleged U.S. containment of China, Beijing ’ south presumed search for regional eminence, or an effort to create exclusionary spheres of influence. While the manner in which both Washington and Beijing address the disputes can surely have an effect on their larger strategic relationship, each maritime incident or action should not be regarded as a measure of the above larger strategic issues. ultimately, these disputes are about asian nationalism and historical memories, not geostrategy, which should instill considerable caution among U.S. policymakers .

Major Actions in the South China Sea (Supplied by Taylor Fravel)

    • 2006-2007: Vietnam increases offshore petroleum exploration projects in waters claimed by China.

 

    • 2006: The State Oceanographic Administration’s Marine Surveillance force begins regular patrols in the South China Sea.

 

    • 2007-2008: China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues demarches and threats against foreign oil companies investing in Vietnam.

 

    • January 2007: The Fourth Plenum of the Vietnam Communist Party’s Central Committee adopts a resolution mandating the development of a national ‘Maritime Strategy Towards the Year 2020.’ The strategy envisions that maritime industries, especially fishing and petroleum, would account for 55 percent of GDP in 2020, up from 48 percent in 2005.

 

    • April 2007: Vietnam establishes one township and two communes in the Truong Sa (Spratly Island) District that administers the Spratly Islands

 

    • November 2007: The Philippine legislature begins debate on an archipelagic baselines law, which includes 53 features from the Spratlys as part of the Philippine archipelago.

 

    • 2008-2009: The number of Vietnamese fishing boats operating near the Paracels increases significantly. China’s Bureau of Fisheries Administration detains Vietnamese fishermen operating near the Paracel Islands.

 

    • June 2008: China’s 2004 joint seismic survey agreement with the Philippines and Vietnam expires and is not renewed.

 

    • Nov 2008: A task force from the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet conducts circumnavigation exercise in the South China Sea.

 

    • February 2009: The Philippine legislature passes an archipelagic baseline law, which included claims to some of the Spratlys. The bill is signed into law in March 2009.

 

    • March 2009: Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi makes a public visit to Swallow Reef, a feature in the South China occupied by Malaysia.

 

    • May 2009: Vietnam independently and with Malaysia submit claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for extended continental shelves in the South China Sea

 

    • May 2009: The Philippines objects to China’s claims to the UN

 

    • May 2009: China’s submits a map with the “nine-dashed line” to the UN Commission on Limits of the Continental Shelf.

 

    • May 2009: China expands the duration of its annual fishing ban about 12 degrees north in the South China Sea. China links patrols by the Bureau of Fisheries Administration with its claims in the South China Sea.

 

    • November 2009: Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry convenes a large international academic conference on the South China Sea to launch its campaign to “internationalize” the dispute.

 

    • January 2010: Vietnam assumes the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN and begins a public effort to build consensus within ASEAN on the South China Sea and to engage the major powers, especially the United States.

 

    • March 2010: The Vietnamese Prime Minister makes a public visit to one of the Vietnamese-held Spratly Islands.

 

    • March 2010: A task Force from the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet conducts training exercises in the South China Sea

 

    • April 2010: Approximately 20 Vietnamese fishing and coast guard vessels surround a Chinese Bureau of Fisheries Administration patrol vessel.

 

    • July 2010: The PLAN conducts an exercise held in the northern portion of the South China Sea with vessels from each of the three fleets in the Chinese navy.

 

    • November 2010: Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry convenes a second international academic conference on the South China Sea

 

    • November 2010: The PLAN’s South Sea Fleet conducts an amphibious assault exercise in the northern part of the South China Sea

 

    • February 2011: The Philippines begins a seismic survey in the waters near Reed Bank.

 

    • March 2011: MSF boats maneuver aggressively around Philippine seismic survey vessel operating at Reed Bank.

 

    • March 2011: Vietnam begins seismic surveys in waters claimed by China.

 

    • April 2011: The Philippines submits a note verbale to the UN contesting in detail China’s claims to territorial sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction.

 

    • May 2011: A MSF vessel severs the towed cable of a Vietnamese seismic survey boat off the coast of central Vietnam in waters China claims

 

    • June 2011: A Chinese fishing boat becomes entangled in the towed cable of a Vietnamese seismic survey vessel

 

    • June 2011: Vietnam holds a live-fire naval exercise in the South China Sea.

 

    • June 2011: Five legislators from the Philippines make high profile visit to Thitu Island held by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands.

 

    • June 2011: Philippines unveils new plan to resolve disputes in the South China, known as a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation. (ZoPFFC), that would limit claims to maritime jurisdiction from contested islands.

 

    • June 2011: Calls grow in the Philippines for inclusion of contested land features in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States

 

    • June 2011: The Philippines names the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea.

 

    • November 2011: Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry hosts a third international academic conference on the South China Sea.

 

    • November 2011: Philippines pushes at its ZoPFFC at the East Asian Summit

 

    • February 2012: The Philippine pushes for ASEAN to negotiate a code of conduct before entering into any talks with China.

 

    • March 2012: The Philippines and Vietnam reach an agreement to hold joint patrols in a portion of the Spratly Island.

 

    • April 2012: The Philippines moves to arrest Chinese fishermen in Scarborough. China dispatches MSF and Fisheries Administration vessels to the shoal and quarantines fruit imports from the Philippines.

 

    • June 2012: Vietnam begins to use advanced Su-27 fighter aircraft to patrol the skies over the South China Sea.

 

    • June 2012: Vietnam’s National Legislature passes a Maritime Law that reiterates its claims to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

 

    • June 2012: China’s State Council upgrades the administrative status of the Paracels and Spratlys from county to prefectural-level city named Sansha.

 

    • June 2012: CNOOC invites bids for exploration blocks located within Vietnam’s 200nm EEZ.

 

    • June 2012: China’s Ministry of Defense announces that China has already established a “combat-ready” patrol system in the South China Sea.

 

    • June 2012: Four MSF ships conduct patrol in the Spratlys

 

    • July 2012: A large fishing fleet from Hainan conducts a high profile trip to the Spratly Islands.

 

  • July 2012: The Sansha military garrison is established in Sansha city.
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