This is unsurprising given the highly close nature of Vietnam on all matters military. Vietnam ‘s Ministry of National Defence ( MND ) rarely publishes authoritative defensive structure white papers ( it did sol in 1998 ( PDF ), 2004 ( PDF ), and most recently in 2009 ( PDF ) ) or comments publicly on military planning. furthermore, Vietnam military think tanks and defense mechanism academies, such as the Institute for Military Strategy, only occasionally offer snapshots of the VPA ‘s think process regarding concepts of operation. therefore, researchers must painstakingly read the tea leaves to begin to scratch the surface of what is happening behind the scenes. Over the death two years, we have conducted precisely this type of inquiry and analysis, and we offer some initial thoughts here .
For starters, we do not know whether Vietnam has a military doctrine for combat in the air and nautical domains—especially one in the western sense of the term. We are very confident, however, that the VPA has two overarching principles that impact all military design. First, Vietnam prioritizes defense—or possibly more accurately and to steal the taiwanese concept, an “ active defense mechanism ” —over discourtesy in military operations. This is merely to say that VPA thinkers tend to suggest that the best strategy is to identify threats and quickly prevent them from changing the condition quo in the South China Sea .
In this vein, counter-amphibious operations are surely a cardinal focus. According to the Institute for Military Strategy, for model, the Vietnam People ‘s Navy ( VPN ) should “ emphasize combatting the enemy from afar, on the sea and on the islands, to counter hostile amphibious operations. ” This is because the VPN has “ reached a certain grade of growth in organization and equipment such as : missile ships, submarines, naval aviation, shore-based anti-ship missiles, long-range artillery, elite forces, island defense forces, and other forces ” to successfully carry out these missions. VPA thinkers are besides concerned about chinese strategic airborne operations onto disputed features in the South China Sea, and a National Defense Academy official has noted the importance of attacking “ the enemy when he is embarking onto planes ” from bases “ on country, on offshore islands, or on enemy ‘s aircraft carriers. ” In this scenario, the VPA stresses using “ air force [ Vietnam Air Defence-Air Force ( VAD-AF ) ], dark blue, long-range missiles, artillery or particular forces to attack the enemy in the area of boarding ” to “ create golden battle conditions. ”
The second keystone principle of Vietnam ‘s military planning is “ all-people ‘s war, ” meaning the mobilization of the entire population to protect the nation. The cardinal dogma of all-people ‘s war is the ability to conduct asymmetrical war against an foe. This approach calls for leveraging the strengths of weaker military forces to exploit the weaknesses of stronger military forces. The idea harkens back to at least the thirteenth hundred, when the legendary Vietnamese war hero Tran Hung Dao successfully employed asymmetrical war tactics to defeat Mongol invaders led by Kublai Khan in malice of their greater numbers and superior weaponry. The concept was reinforced over clock time as Vietnam during the twentieth hundred successfully repelled french, American, and chinese troops from its dirty. today, vietnamese leaders expect to continue using asymmetrical tactics, though this time, military operations will take position in the air and at ocean to contend with China in the South China Sea. indeed, one interlocutor told us that Vietnam was preparing for “ people ‘s war at ocean. ”
To carry out people ‘s war at sea, the VPN has said “ we need to exploit our geography, specially our caves and islands as places to post and hide our ships and to support operations logistically. ” According to well-known vietnamese military commentator Le Ngoc Thong, submarines are dependable suited to asymmetric combat because they are quietly, quick, and small—likely the reason Vietnam in 2009 purchased six Kilo-class submarines. additionally, the VPN ‘s purchase of footing mobile “ fire and forget ” anti-ship cruise missiles, such as the Bastion-P, could give Vietnam the opportunity to attack chinese surface vessels without exposing itself to substantial gamble of retaliatory fire.
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Launching a people ‘s war at ocean has besides meant leveraging Vietnam ‘s people power—a hallmark of communist political orientation absorbed over the decades by many Vietnamese while training in soviet and chinese military academies. As such, Vietnam in April 2014 established the civilian-run but light-armed Vietnam Fisheries Surveillance Force ( VFSF ). The VFSF patrols the waters and complements growing numbers of Vietnam Coast Guard ( VCG ) vessels, which might be operating under more indulgent rules of battle soon. additionally, MND recruits local fisherman and outfits them with infrared vision and communications equipment to monitor fishing disputes. According to one vietnamese estimate, this fishing militia now features 8,000 boats and works close with VPN, VCG, frame guards, and fishermen to monitor and report reign violations. The goal is to prevent an embarrassing recur of the May 2014 oil rig incident with China. After placing an vegetable oil rig in challenge waters, Beijing sent an overwhelm number of slide precaution vessels and fish trawlers, supported by naval and air assets, to patrol the waters and aggressively ram vietnamese vessels out of the way .
There is much less information available on the VAD-AF ‘s concept of air operations. however, it is clean the objective is to provide cover to naval and nautical forces in a defensive put. The headman of VPA air defense mechanism, for example, underscored that people ‘s air defense units “ can deploy quickly, create low to medium elevation air defense to protect units…in support of national publicize defense in countering hostile forces. ” Otherwise, it appears the VAD-AF ‘s fixed-wing aircraft, such as Su-30s, are lone exploit when absolutely needed. In the words of a vietnamese National Defense Academy official, the “ breeze force may even be used if circumstances permit ” in a counter-attack scenario—underscoring that any use of military aircraft in any position would be quite extraordinary. notably, we have seen no references to air-to-air operations.
Going ahead, Vietnam clearly has directing principles for how it seeks to wage fight in the South China Sea, and has acquired many useful weapons systems to do so. however, Vietnam ‘s evolving military doctrine will surely be tested by the VPA ‘s unfamiliarity with fight in the sea and air domains. Far longer distances and unpredictable weather conditions in the area airs just a few of the many new problems the VPA will encounter in the South China Sea. As a historically land-centric military, the VPA will have to think more deeply—and discipline more regularly and realistically—in these domains to stand the best probability in a future battle .
Derek Grossman is a elder defensive structure analyst at the nonprofit organization, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He once served as the daily intelligence abbreviated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs at the Pentagon. Nguyen Nhat Anh is a dominate scholar at the University of California San Diego ‘s School of Global Policy and Strategy, where he focuses on international politics, economics and strategic studies. He besides worked at the Center for Strategic & International Studies ‘ Reconnecting Asia Program, and with the United Nations in Bangkok .
This comment primitively appeared on Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative on May 11, 2018. comment gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertness and much on their peer-reviewed inquiry and analysis .