By Victoria Samson and Brian Weeden
A growing chorus of peak U.S. military chiefs and bipartisan political leaders has voiced alarms on the proliferation of space threats. Yet, those same voices have been much quiet on the potential solutions, aside from calls for the United States to grow even stronger. It is time for the United States to return to its historical function and aim extra legally binding measures to enhance the security and stability of space, including space arms master, as part of a more holistic approach that includes volunteer measures as well .
Doing so will not be slowly. Space is a singular knowledge domain, with its own physical, legal, and political dynamics. barely any of the work necessary to develop the conceptual foundations for space arms restraint has been done, let alone to define how to meet the conditions for measures that are equitable and confirmable and enhance U.S. national security as laid out in current U.S. policy. All of these, however, are challenges that should be overcome, not insurmountable obstacles, because ensuring the long-run sustainability and security of space for the benefit of all is an end resultant role besides important to ignore .Emerging Threats to Space Security and Stability
space capabilities are a crucial region of U.S. national security. It is unmanageable to find a current U.S. military operation anywhere in the populace that does not rely on outer space data or services in some room. Satellites besides provide critical intelligence data on potential future threats, deoxyadenosine monophosphate well as warning of at hand attacks on the United States and its allies. In addition to these congress of racial equality military and intelligence applications, outer space capabilities underpin the ability to predict and warn the american public about dangerous weather and lifelike disasters and monitor the transfer climate. Space capabilities besides are integrated into national and ball-shaped fare, fiscal, and communications systems .
The reliance on and importance of quad capabilities for national security has sparked investment in the exploitation of offense counterspace capabilities to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or demolish quad systems during times of enhance tensions and armed conflict. These capabilities include nondestructive jam and intervention with satellite signals and functions, cyberattacks, and flush outright destruction. Primarily, Russia and China are investing in these capabilities ; but France, India, Iran, Japan, North Korea, and the United States are besides active. 1 As counterspace technologies mature, they will probable far proliferate to other countries and potentially to nonstate actors. Since 2005, there have been 20 anti-satellite ( ASAT ) weapons tests in space or against satellites by four different countries, a pace of testing that has not happened since the 1960s. 2
In addition to outright weapons testing, there have been a growing number of concerning activities in space. many of these involve rendezvous and proximity operations ( RPOs ), or measuredly close approaches of other space objects by satellites. Although RPOs have been conducted since the 1960s as contribution of human spaceflight operations, automatic RPO capabilities over the end two decades have been more wide developed for a roll of commercial, civil, and home security applications. There is growing concern that such activities might increase tensions between countries or could be misinterpreted as a hostile carry through that precipitates an armed attack .
The current international legal model is largely permissive, at least implicitly, toward the development, testing, and deployment of counterspace capabilities and conducting RPOs. While the 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans the placement of nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass end in knocked out distance, there are broadly no specific restrictions on testing or deployment of non-nuclear weapons in space. And while the Charter of the United Nations prohibits aggression in distance fair as it does mundanely, there is no consensus on what constitutes a use of force or armed attack against quad capabilities or how external humanitarian law applies to an armed conflict that extends into distance. There is besides a lack of consensus on norms of demeanor for conducting military activities in space during peacetime, including close approaches of other satellites .
top U.S. military and political leaders have voiced alarm clock over the proliferation of outer space threats, but so far, there has been little willingness to discuss legally binding measures to restrict or halt them. The main strategy of the United States has been to increase the resilience of its own quad systems and develop its own nauseating counterspace capabilities with the goal of deterring attacks and winning a war should deterrence fail. 3 The United States has besides voiced support for volunteer measures on some categories of distance activities, such as mitigating the universe of orbital debris and sharing space situational awareness ( SSA ) data, but has not put forward specific proposals related to military or home security activities in space .
It is prison term for the United States to return to its historical function and propose extra legally binding measures to enhance the security and stability of space, including quad arms control. The United States has played a key character in developing and enforcing legally binding security system mechanisms in closely every other domain of military natural process and has hanker recognized the rate these mechanisms can play in enhancing U.S. national security and international stability. As the space power of potential U.S. adversaries grows, so excessively do the negative implications of that outer space exponent for U.S. interests. The United States needs to decide what types of space capabilities and ability relationships present a terror to U.S. national security and the best way to mitigate or remove that terror .
so far, it is not a matter of simply replicating for quad the legal mechanisms and controls that have proven successful in early domains. Space is a singular arena, with its own physical, legal, and political dynamics. other domains can provide useful context and examples, but can not be applied wholesale. additionally, a considerable measure of work is needed to develop the strong conceptual foundations for space arms control, alike to what was done for nuclear arms operate .
Multilateral Forums
respective multilateral forums have discussed stream outer space security system challenges, but these discussions have yielded identical limited advancement. Most of the proposals for legally binding agreements on space security issues have gone nowhere largely because their proponents and opponents were not acting in good religion. There has been some achiever with non-legally binding agreements, but few of them address security issues .
The huge majority of legally binding proposals on outer space security have emerged within the league on Disarmament ( cadmium ), which has had an agenda detail on the prevention of an arms race in knocked out space since the 1980s. 4 These efforts have never taken root, in part due to the inability of the cadmium to agree on a work plan. 5 In addition to this agenda token, the compact disk deals with a wide compass of contentious security issues, including nuclear disarming, a fissile material cutoff treaty, and damaging security assurances, and respective states have sought to block progress on some or all of these issues by tying them together .
specific to quad security system, Russia and China have been the most active in the four hundred by repeatedly proposing initiatives to ban placement of weapons in out distance, but these measures have never gained widespread international acceptance. They proposed an agreement titled the Treaty on the prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects ( PPWT ) in 2008, which was modified reasonably in 2014 in an feat to meet concerns about its lack of verification, but has not seen much progress toward adoption since that clock time. 6 More holocene proposals for no inaugural placement of weapons in space have not had much grip either, although a UN General Assembly settlement of corroborate was passed in November 2019. 7
between 2017 and 2019, three different UN bodies tried and failed to make any significant progress on quad security system issues in a multilateral context. In February 2018, the CD agreed to form four auxiliary bodies to deal with individual agenda items in the absence of an overall work plan. auxiliary torso three was tasked with looking at the prevention of an arms slipstream in out space. 8 Through 2018, it met six times and was able to agree on a consensus report, which was forwarded to the cadmium plenary. Yet, the four hundred was not able to adopt a final report to send to the UN General Assembly due to political difficulties with the presidency of one extremity state. rather, its final merchandise was just a procedural report .
There are several winder issues behind the current deadlock and failure of the certificate of deposit. It has become a forum where states take ideological positions or air out larger geopolitical grievances. On space security, this manifests in Russia and China using the proposed PPWT as a diplomatic cudgel to publicly demonize the United States on space weaponization while developing their own ground-based space weapons that would not fall under the restrictions established by the PPWT. The United States for its separate has rejected any legally dressing proposals on space security, rather wanting the tractability to develop future weapons capabilities, including space-based projectile defenses, while accusing Russia and China of weaponizing space. 9 thus, the United States mobilized its allies to object to the PPWT and no-first-placement proposals while never offering alternatives of its own .
As a result of the certificate of deposit deadlock, there have been several attempts to discuss quad security issues through other means. One of these was the 2008 proposal by the European Union for a draft code of behave for distance. The draft code was by and large a conglomeration of fairly benign, uncontroversial best practices that EU members felt would be helpful for the security and constancy of space. It fell aside, however, once international negotiations began because of a lack of broader diplomatic support and disagreement over how the document should view self-defense in quad. By the clock the UN had a converge on it in July 2015, its momentum had expired. Although the EU has not officially shelved the draft code, it has not had any more formal discussions on the document either. 10
A more successful undertake at coming to agreement on space security system principles was made by a UN group of governmental experts that met in 2012 and 2013. This outer space experts group had a diverse geographic representation and reached consensus on recommendations for foil and confidence-building measures in out space activities. 11 Some of the measures included recommendations for information sharing on national policies and activities in out space, notifications of gamble reduction efforts, and voluntary visits to launch sites. Yet, execution of these recommendations has been minimal and frankincense has had limited impact on space security and constancy .
The UN Disarmament Commission, which is part of the General Assembly, established a working group to find ways in which the recommendations of the 2013 experts group on quad transparency and confidence-building measures could be implemented. 12 The working group was not able to convene in the bounce of 2019 because russian delegates had visa issues preventing them from getting to the UN meet in New York .
In December 2017, the General Assembly asked the UN secretary-general to form an experts group on far practical measures on preventing an arms race in outer space. 13 The delegates met in the summer of 2018 and spring of 2019. separate of their mandate was to look at elements of a legally binding treaty, using the proposed PPWT as a basis for discussions, and other elements that might be introduced to make an agreement on preventing an arms race in out space solve. At some points during the negotiations, it seemed that a consensus document might emerge from this experts group, but none ultimately was achieved. 14
Over this same time period from 2010 to 2018, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space concluded a identical successful eight-year campaign to develop voluntary guidelines for the long-run sustainability of space. 15 This effort was alone in that it brought more than 90 member states together to reach consensus on issues ranging from mitigating orbital debris to sharing SSA data and quad weather data and developing home policy and regulative frameworks. respective countries, led by the United States, powerfully opposed including any security issues in the sustainability discussions, arguing that they were outside the mandate of the UN committee, and opposed making the guidelines legally binding. The sustainability discussions besides survived changeless opposition from Russia through much of the work that arose from geopolitical tensions between the United States and Russia over the conflict in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea .
In the most holocene attempt, the United Kingdom proposed a General Assembly resolving power in August 2020 to try and take a different sheet on space security. 16 The UK proposal tries to shift the space security discussion from banning or controlling specific technologies to looking at actions and behaviors in space and developing a more unite position on threats to outer space security. As a start point, it calls for UN member states to report to the secretary-general what they believe creditworthy and threaten demeanor in space looks like. The UK proposal survived enemy from Russia and several other countries and was adopted by the UN General Assembly First Committee in early November 2020. 17
Some of these non-CD efforts have been at least partially successful, but tied those achievements highlight the challenges of making progress on space security issues. All of the successful efforts have been voluntary in nature, which the United States favors but many other countries oppose. All of them have avoided hard security issues, but even had to spend years developing common understandings of terminology, convincing developed and developing states of the importance of the issue, expanding national capacity and processes to develop individual state positions, and ultimately voyage geopolitical storms. Most importantly, none of the successful initiatives have addressed any of the kernel fundamental issues behind the pressing security challenges facing the space world .
The Need for Space Arms Control
With these failures and shortcomings, the need remains for diplomatic and legal agreements to address the proliferation of counterspace capabilities and the growing instability in space. First and first, there must be a recognition that there is no silver bullet for solving the core quad security challenges. Like many “ wicked ” problems, 18 they are complex and will require multiple approaches that combine voluntary and legally binding efforts working together as separate of a comprehensive hale. A act of concepts and ideas can serve as a begin point for far discussion on developing a substantive framework to enhance quad security and stability .
Second, although many countries will need to play a function in resolving these challenges, the United States must take a leadership function. The United States is silent the most mighty country in distance and has the most to lose, should space devolve into an arena of unrestrained weaponization and electric potential armed conflict. Preventing this claim result was depart of the impulse that drove the United States to play a major function in creating the stream external legal regimen in space, such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, that has served the United States and the world so well .
Third, the consideration of legally binding measures in space is consistent with historic U.S. policy. closely every U.S. national space policy since the Eisenhower administration has endorsed pursuing outer space arms control and other legally binding agreements. 19 The current policy, issued in June 2010 by the Obama administration, states, “ The United States will pursue bilateral and multilateral foil and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the passive manipulation of, space. The United States will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, [ are ] effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies. ” 20 Thus, the starting point should be what those three conditions—equitable, confirmable, and U.S. national security-enhancing—might mean .
Measures That Enhance U.S. National Security
Beginning with the one-third of the conditions, determining how best to enhance the national security of the United States and its allies should be the starting bespeak of any arms operate discussion. indeed, it was the realization that nuclear arms control condition restrictions on the Soviets could improve U.S. national security that led to some of the initial political support for nuclear arms control. Since the 1980s, however, U.S. leaders have concluded that space arms control would hinder the United States more than its potential adversaries. This vehemence on “ freedom of natural process ” stemmed from the intend that the United States should leave its options open to be able to develop whatever space capabilities and weapons that could provide benefits in the future .
yet, that position is changing. other countries, peculiarly China and Russia, have developed their own counterspace capabilities, and many of the underlying technologies are quickly coming down in price and complexity. Capabilities that were once only within the range of the United States and possibly the Soviet Union are now potentially available to many other countries, even nonstate and commercial actors. This commoditization and proliferation is a drift happening across the outer space sector and will continue to accelerate. Hence, there should be a reincarnate debate as to what space capabilities in truth benefit U.S. home security and which ones present a menace to U.S. national security .
Most discussions of what capabilities might threaten U.S. national security system more than benefit it zero in on destructive quiz of ASAT weapons. destructive ASAT weapons tests have created closely 5,000 pieces of orbital debris since the 1960s, more than 3,000 of which inactive pose seafaring hazards to satellites. 21 durable orbital debris poses a threat to critical U.S. national security assets, homo spaceflight operations, and the future commercial growth of space, all of which are priorities for the United States and its allies. A legally bind agreement that prevents destructive testing of ASAT weapons or at least that which generates durable orbital debris should be at the top of the list for consideration .
Thinking further into the future, the United States needs to consider that potential future space weapons not presently deployed nowadays might pose more of a threat to U.S. security than benefits. A recent paper suggested that space-to-earth weapons might fall into this category because they would sporadically overfly the United States and its allies and could pose an indefensible threat for U.S. political leaders. 22 Placing such weapons into orbit is not explicitly illegal under the existing space law regimen although it does explicitly allow their unexclusive overflight of every area. Changing either of those aspects of current law might be something the United States could consider .
Verifiability
confirmation is defined as any process designed to demonstrate a party ’ south complaisance or disobedience with an agreement or treaty. In traditional nuclear arms control, a boastfully function of confirmation involves using satellites that are normally referenced by the euphemism “ national technical means ” to observe and measure objects and activities on worldly concern. For exemplar, electro-optical imagination satellites can count the number of projectile silo and measure the distance and diameter of ballistic missiles to determine their performance. Radio-frequency signal intercept satellites can detect and capture radar emissions and telemetry, tracking, and dominate signals .
Countries and special concern groups hostile to the concept of space arms control much assert that it is impossible to verify quad weapons and consequently space arms control is not feasible. That is true to a point : it is highly unmanageable to determine whether a satellite is a weapon, in big part because there are many ways that a satellite can be used for weapons effects. This assertion, however, hides two things. It is possible to verify many types of actions in distance, such as a close approach of another object or a collision that generates large amounts of orbital debris. besides, it is more difficult to use a satellite to harm another satellite than much postulated, and militaries are much more likely to choose custom-designed weapons to achieve craved effects than try to modify a commercial or civil satellite .
From a technical foul position, the United States is already laying the foundations of space verification. SSA has been a top priority for the United States and many other countries for more than a ten now and includes monitor and characterizing activities in space. It is precisely these capabilities that allowed the United States to publicly assert that Russia tested a outer space weapon in July 2020. 23 This suggests that the United States already has some of the capabilities necessity to verify the quiz or deployment of ASAT weapons in quad. The key emergence is matching existing capabilities with the legal stipulations of a future agreement and ensuring the other parties in the treaty can besides feel confident in their own verification abilities. For example, only the United States presently has the ability to verify the launch of a direct-ascent ASAT weapon from earth, but several countries and commercial companies could verify that it collided with a satellite and created large amounts of orbital debris .
Equitability
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The third base prerequisite outlined in existing U.S. policy, that measures be equitable, is presently the most undefined and potentially challenging to define. There is no park definition among arms master negotiators of “ equitable. ” At best, you could credibly get practitioners to agree that it means all parties are affected by the agreement and benefit from it, but not inevitably in precisely equal ways. For case, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty caps the number of versatile types of warheads and deployed ballistic missiles that the United States and Russia are allowed to have, with the capital being the same on each side. Yet, each side has tractability on the number and types of platforms it can develop and deploy within those caps. The benefit to both countries is a restrict on unrestricted arms racing and avoiding ball-shaped nuclear war .
Finding agreement elsewhere has proven more unmanageable. The issue of equitability has stymied progress on the proposed PPWT, and the two sides of the debate on preventing an arms rush in out space do not agree on the threat that needs to be addressed, while besides having different capabilities for and interests in space. The United States has integrated space enhancement capabilities into its home security infrastructure to a much higher degree than Russia and China. Russia has focused more attempt on integrating counterspace capabilities, particularly electronic war. China is developing integrate counterspace and integrated space enhancement capabilities, although it distillery lags the United States in results for the latter .
therefore, restricting the development of ground-based ASAT weapons would affect Russia and China more than the United States, 24 unless those restrictions besides include limits on the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system capabilities the United States presently has deployed. That, however, may be politically indefensible for U.S. policymakers, who have made these missile defenses the main response to nuclear threats from Iran and North Korea .
Limits or bans on deployment or screen of space-based weapons may be more equitable, but present their own political challenges, again related to nuclear weapons. Despite the massive, built-in economic and technical challenges, a vocal minority in the United States hush argue strongly for a “ space-based projectile harbor ” that can theoretically protect the United States from nuclear attack. Such a capability would undermine russian and chinese nuclear deterrents, which is why preventing the deployment of space-based interceptors is the focal indicate of the PPWT. In an campaign to counter U.S. satellite capabilities, Russia and China are besides experimenting with co-orbital ASAT weapons of their own, which the United States considers to be a major terror. thus, there may be a way to create a limit or ban on space-based weapons that restricts and benefits all the major parties, although not inevitably in precisely the like ways .
Although all legitimate challenges, they are not insuperable, should the United States make an attempt to meet them. During the Cold War, the United State poured considerable resources and political will into creating the intellectual foundations for nuclear arms operate, establishing confirmation capabilities, and crafting negotiating positions that linked everything together. No such feat has been done for quad in the last 20 years and would probably be necessary for any legally dressing agreements on outer space security system to be taken seriously .
Baby Steps
The prospects of legally binding agreements on space security remain distant, but the United States can take concrete actions to improve space security and stability. As a originate orient, the United States, Russia, and China should discuss definitions of agree behavior for military activities in space, in particular the interactions between their military satellites in space, akin to the discussions that led to the Incidents at Sea Agreement during the Cold War. 25 As in the case of nautical operations, clarifying norms of demeanor for noncooperative rendezvous and proximity operations and, where possible, providing notifications of approaching activities can help reduce the chances of misperceptions that could increase tensions or spark conflict. As part of these discussions, the main distance powers need to contribution their perspectives on how the existing laws of armed conflict use to military quad activities .
The United States can besides lay the foundation for a bachelor of arts in nursing on debris-creating ASAT weapons tests. This includes developing a whole-of-government understand of the respect of such a limitation and the ask verification capabilities. Encouraging voluntary moratoriums on such test could send a mighty political signal and counter their current international credence, but only as a basis for moving to a legally binding agreement, as was the character with nuclear testing. The main difference is that space agreements are likely to start at least as trilateral ( the United States, Russia, and China ) and late expand to include other space powers, such as some european nations, Japan, and India. immediately pushing for a broad multilateral agreement within the UN on preventing an arms race in forbidden space or other distance security topics would be ineffective. In this domain, the UN is more effective for normalizing ideas and agreements generated elsewhere than creating them .
finally, throughout these discussions, the United States should recognize that distance is a cross-cutting return and likely can not be in full separated from nuclear arms control or broader economic and national security issues. Space security should be included where relevant in other security conversations, and any discussion of space security proposals should be examined for their shock on early domains. For case, potential bans on ASAT weapons testing or deployment of co-orbital ASAT weapons are probable to have impacts on projectile defense. Difficult decisions will need to be made on how to balance the benefits and consequences of limiting all countries ’ abilities to pursue certain space technologies or lead certain outer space activities that could have negative consequences for everyone .
The U.S. approach toward meeting disruptions to the security and stability of space has focused about entirely on an offensive counterspace capability build-up and, to a lesser extent, desegregate messaging about purpose and determent. It is clock that all potential options to bolster U.S. national security in space and international strategic stability were in full explored. For this to happen, the United States has to acknowledge the strategic benefits of a fully holistic approach, begin sketching out what it hopes to achieve with space arms dominance, and start laying the basis for doing a cost-benefit analysis of the options it would be bequeath to forgo in ordain to persuade competitors to abandon even bigger threats to the United States .
ENDNOTES
1. Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, eds., “ Global Counterspace Capabilities : An Open Source Assessment, ” Secure World Foundation, April 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //swfound.org/media/206970/swf_counterspace2020_electronic_final.pdf .
2. Brian Weeden and Kaila Pfrang, “ History of ASAT Tests in Space, ” August 6, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1e5GtZEzdo6xk41i2_ei3c8jRZDjvP4Xwz3BVsUHwi48/edit # gid=0 .
3. U.S. Department of Defense and Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, “ National Security Space Strategy : Unclassified Summary, ” January 2011, hypertext transfer protocol : //archive.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassified
Summary_Jan2011.pdf ; U.S. Department of Defense, “ Defense Space Strategy Summary, ” June 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/-1/1/2020_DEFENSE_SPACE_STRATEGY_SUMMARY.PDF .
4. “ extinct outer space : mobilization, Weaponization, and the Prevention of an Arms Race, ” Reaching Critical Will, n.d., hypertext transfer protocol : //www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space ( access November 9, 2020 ) .
5. “ conference on Disarmament ( cadmium ), ” Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 26, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/conference-on-disarmament/ .
6. Michael Listner and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “ The 2014 PPWT : A New Draft but With the Same and Different Problems, ” The Space Review, August 11, 2014, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.thespacereview.com/article/2575/1 .
7. “ First Committee Approves 11 Drafts Covering Control Over Conventional Arms, Outer Space Security, as United States Withdraws Text on Transparency, ” GA/DIS/3642, November 5, 2019, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.un.org/press/en/2019/gadis3642.doc.htm .
8. Daniel Porras, “ PAROS and STM in the united nations : More Than Just Acronym Soup ” ( presentation, UT Austin/Space Traffic Management conference, February 27, 2019 ), hypertext transfer protocol : //commons.erau.edu/stm/2019/presentations/22/ .
9. “ statement by Ambassador Wood : The Threats Posed by Russia and China to Security of the Outer Space Environment, ” U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, August 14, 2019, hypertext transfer protocol : //geneva.usmission.gov/2019/08/14/statement-by-ambassador-wood-the-threats-posed-by-russia-and-china-to-security-of-the-outer-space-environment/ .
10. Michael Krepon, “ Space Code of Conduct Mugged in New York, ” ArmsControlWonk.com, August 4, 2015, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/404712/space-code-of-conduct-mugged-in-new-york/ .
11. UN General Assembly, “ Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities : note by the Secretary-General, ” A/68/189, July 29, 2013 .
12. 2018 UN Disarmament Commission Working Group II, Secretariat nonpaper, n.d., hypertext transfer protocol : //www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/WG2-secretariat-non-paper-outer-space-TCBMs-FINAL.pdf .
13. UN General Assembly, “ Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms raceway in Outer Space, ” A/RES/72/250, January 12, 2018 .
14. A adaptation of their find oneself was leaked, leading some participants to raise concerns about the ability to participate in future groups of governmental experts .
15. “ The UN COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, ” Secure World Foundation, November 2019, hypertext transfer protocol : //swfound.org/media/206891/swf_un_copuos_lts_guidelines_fact_sheet_november-2019-1.pdf. Secure World Foundation Executive Director Peter Martinez served as the working group electric chair for these discussions prior to joining the foundation garment .
16. “ UK Push for Landmark UN Resolution to Agree Responsible Behaviour in Space, ” UK Foreign Office, August 26, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-push-for-landmark-un-resolution-to-agree-responsible-behaviour-in-space .
17. “ Sending 14 Drafts to General Assembly, First Committee Defeats Motion Questioning Its competence to Approve One Aimed at Tackling Outer Space Threats, ” GA/DIS/3657, November 4, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.un.org/press/en/2020/gadis3657.doc.htm. For a breakdown of the votes of the solution ’ south paragraph, see Reaching Critical Will, Twitter thread, November 6, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //twitter.com/RCW_/status/1324745999361822721 ? s=20 .
18. Brian Head, “ Wicked Problems in Public Policy, ” Public Policy, Vol. 3, No. 2 ( January 2008 ) : 101-118 .
19. The lone exception was the national space policy issued by the George W. Bush presidency on August 31, 2006. See “ U.S. National Space Policy, ” n.d., hypertext transfer protocol : //aerospace.org/sites/default/files/policy_archives/Natl % 20Space % 20Policy % 20fact % 20sheet % 2031Aug06.pdf .
20. “ National Space Policy of the United States of America, ” June 28, 2010, p. 7, hypertext transfer protocol : //obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf .
21. Weeden and Pfrang, “ History of ASAT Tests in Space. ”
22. Michael P. Gleason and Peter L. Hays, “ A Roadmap for Assessing Space Weapons, ” Center for Space Policy and Strategy, October 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/Gleason-Hays_SpaceWeapons_20201005_1.pdf .
23. U.S. Space Command Public Affairs Office, “ Russia Conducts Space-Based Anti-Satellite Weapons Test, ” July 23, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.spacecom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/2285098/russia-conducts-space-based-anti-satellite-weapons-test/.
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24. For promote information, see Kaitlyn Johnson, “ A Balance of Instability : Effects of a Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Weapons Ban on Nuclear Stability, ” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 21, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //defense360.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/2Kaitlyn_A-Balance-of-Instability.pdf. She notes that “ [ watt ] hile a direct-ascent [ anti-satellite ( ASAT ) weapons ] bachelor of arts in nursing may reinforce stability in the space domain—and potentially other domains such as air, land, and sea—it may destabilize the nuclear domain because China and Russia view direct-ascent ASAT weapons as assurance of their nuclear arsenals ’ success against U.S. projectile defense systems. ” Ibid., p. 11 .
25. Michael Listner, “ A Bilateral Approach From Maritime Law to Prevent Incidents in Space, ” The Space Review, February 16, 2009, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.thespacereview.com/article/1309/1 .
Victoria Samson is the Washington office director and Brian Weeden is the conductor for broadcast plan at the Secure World Foundation, a nonprofit foundation dedicated to the long-run sustainability of space for benefits on Earth .