Over the past six years, Xi Jinping ’ mho Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) has become so omnipresent in the PRC ’ s external discourse and bodily process that it is now about impossible to distinguish it from China ’ s overall extraneous policy. even though Beijing presents the inaugural as designed to enhance economic prosperity via the creation of physical linkages across the ball, its real aim is not infrastructure-building but the initiation of a new world order in which China thrives and rules. 1 The perception opening between what BRI is in reality ( a springboard to achieve the “ China dream of the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation ” ) and what Beijing claims it is ( an economic cooperation proposal and not a “ China golf club ” ) 2 is the result of a deliberate Party-State global influence campaign waged since BRI ’ south origin. 3
To enable BRI ’ s smooth promotion and implementation abroad and ensure early countries ’ cooperative behavior, Beijing has not only carefully crafted a benevolent narrative around BRI that has been wide disseminated worldwide, but besides established, mobilized, and coordinated a web of specific “ Belt and Road ” organizations that act as proxies for central Party-State organs. As separate of the PRC ’ randomness united movement influence ( 统战工作 ), 4 their role is to shape extraneous perceptions and behaviors in a manner favorable to BRI, while at the same time inhibiting potential attempts to criticize or counter it. They broadly use the same techniques as the ones differently observed in China ’ second usual joined battlefront function activities targeting foreign audiences, such as lavish propaganda campaigns deoxyadenosine monophosphate well as respective inducements ( fiscal, prestige, access, and other rewards ) offered to institutions and individuals. The creation of raw entities specifically dedicated to influence foreign perceptions about BRI, giving them not only extra fund but a clear focus and a sense of function, reflects how the PRC ’ south united front exercise is adequate to of mutating and metastasizing. They are the newest face of agents of influence that operate for the benefit of the chinese Party-State in promoting its most ambitious and important foreign policy first step.
In the Party-State ’ s extensive battle to win alien hearts and minds over BRI, three communities – international media, academia and business – stand out a critical targets. A dress of specific “ Belt and Road cooperation ” platforms have been created for each of them. The aim of this paper is to unveil them and situate them within the PRC ’ s wider unify front work efforts .
1. Media
Media is used by the chinese propaganda apparatus to spread the BRI charitable and cocksure narrative global 5 via the usual channels that the Central Propaganda Department controls :
- Printed media that publish State-anointed information translated in extraneous languages ( including China Daily inserts under the “ China Watch ” claim published in western newspapers such as The Washington Post and The Telegraph ) ; 6
- Broadcast media including movie production, video clips, television and radio stations. In the runup to the May 2017 Belt and Road international forum, a pour of video clips was produced, showing, among other things, english-speaking children singing BRI ’ s praises, and a western beget telling BRI bedtime stories to his daughter. 7 A series of CGTN documentaries, showcasing BRI ’ s stunning achievements around the world started broadcasting in 2016 ; 8
- Digital media such as websites and social media networks ( including Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, which are not allowed in China ). A Xinhua web site specifically dedicated to BRI-related newsworthiness was launched in March 2017, 9 and its articles are accessible in English, Arabic, French, Spanish and Russian. A BRI internet portal vein is hosted under a “ .gov.cn ” address, besides with articles accessible in six different languages. 10 Although their description does not reveal who precisely is behind the Twitter wield, several Twitter accounts relay a positive imagination of BRI. 11
In addition to the common external dissemination techniques, the Central Propaganda Department is besides increasingly using BRI as a rallying composition to seek cooperation with alien media outlets. Media cooperation indeed “ plays an crucial function for presenting the real images to spouse countries of the ‘ Belt and Road ’. ” 12 The objective is to reach out directly to foreign journalists and media outlets in order to create and nurture a pool of “ friends ” that will absorb and deliver made-in-China propaganda through their local media channels. A count of initiatives have appeared since 2014 .
Belt and Road Media Cooperation Union (一带一路媒体传播联盟)
13 One of them is the “ Belt and Road Media Cooperation Alliance ” ( besides translated as “ Belt and Road Media Cooperation Union, ” 14 一带一路媒体传播联盟 ), launched in April 2016 by the State Council Information Office ( 国务院新闻办公室, SCIO ), which is the State Council name of the CCP Central Office of Foreign Propaganda. 15 The Media Alliance aims at pooling resources, encouraging joint platform production, disseminating, market, and jointly presenting “ authentic, accurate, inspire and scheme stories of Belt and Road. ” 16 As of March 2017, 43 ball-shaped media organizations have joined. They are largely media corporations and television receiver channels from developing countries along the Belt and Road, but besides include the National Geographic, Discovery Channel, and Channel News Asia. Since 2017, VideoChina has offered to provide subject that members of the Media Alliance can use under license, for streaming or for buy. The Media Alliance is besides preparing the development of satellite television channels to cover Belt and Road countries .
“ Authentic and intriguing ” Belt and Road stories are therefore created by the CCP central propaganda agency, which keeps editorial control condition over kernel. These prefabricated products are then provided to media outlets in Belt and Road countries that do not necessarily have the fiscal resources or technical means to produce content independently. This method is an illustration of the tactic known as “ borrowing a boat to go out to sea ” ( 借船出海 ), i.e. using a local entity to promote the chinese Party-State propaganda to foreign audiences. 17
Scholarships and train programs for journalists from Belt and Road countries have besides been deployed. The “ Dongfang Fellowship Program ” ( 东方奖学金项目 ), for case, is jointly hosted by China Daily, the Shanghai International Studies University ( SISU ) and the University of International Business and Economics ( UIBE ) and sponsored by China Eastern Airlines. senior editors and reporters from 12 Belt and Road countries have participated in a 26-day train broadcast in 2018 to “ gain a full understand of China ’ mho development in the modern era. ” 18
Media Cooperation Forums on the Belt and Road (“一带一路”媒体合作论坛)
19 Since 2014, the People ’ s Daily has convened four consecutive “ Media Cooperation Forum[s] on Belt and Road ” ( “ 一带一路 ” 媒体合作论坛 ) which have included over 460 journalists from 126 countries. 20 eleven Jinping sent a congratulatory letter to the participants of the 2016 Forum, which illustrates its political importance. In his letter, he wrote that the media “ plays an irreplaceable function in information dispersion, reciprocal trust, and consensus [ … ] I hope that the media in diverse countries will make good use of this platform to [ … ] play an active role in the construction of the Belt and Road. ” 21 The People ’ sulfur Daily ’ sulfur president, Yang Zhenwu 杨振武, explained that the aim of the forum was to “ formulate an information expressway, tear down emotional barriers, expand the encircle of friends, and form a cultural concentric circle. ” During the September 2017 forum, Yang announced the launch of a “ Belt and Road Media Cooperation Centre ” and a “ Cross-border Joint Reporting Project ” specifically dedicated to “ tone [ ing ] cooperation among domestic and international media on the Belt and Road. ” 22 Memorandums of reason and roast declarations have already been signed with 36 media from 26 countries under this model. 23
Belt and Road News Alliance (一带一路新闻合作联盟)
24 The “ Belt and Road News Alliance ” ( BRNA, 一带一路新闻合作联盟, Belt and Road News Cooperation Alliance ), an mind that emanated from the State Council in April 2016, 25 was beginning launched by CCTV during the May 2017 Belt and Road Forum with a mission to “ aid key media organizations in countries along the Belt and Road. ” It originally included 63 members from 35 countries. 26 It seems not to have been very active for the watch two years and was reborn as “ Belt and Road News Network ” ( BRNN, keeping its original chinese list of 一带一路新闻合作联盟 ) during the irregular B & R Forum in April 2019, in order to “ serve as a platform for information sharing, exchanges and cooperation, news distribution, and copyright trade among media outlets along the BRI. ” Its membership has expanded to 182 members from 86 countries. 27 eleven Jinping sent a congratulatory letter to BRNN ’ s inauguration council meet, read by the principal of the Central Propaganda Department, Huang Kunming 黄坤明. The People ’ s Daily acts as BRNN ’ s “ CEO unit ” ( 理事长单位 ). 28
When not creating fresh platforms for enhance international media cooperation to serve as echo chambers for positive reports on BRI, the Central Propaganda Department uses existing international fora to rally potential media partners. For exercise, during the 2017 asian Media Summit 29 held in Qingdao, then vice-Premier and former UFWD head Liu Yandong 刘延东 emphasized in her open remarks that “ media collaboration is an significant part of deepening regional cooperation and working in concert on projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative. ”
2. Academia
In a speech made at the Warsaw Silk Road Forum in June 2016, Xi Jinping enjoined think tanks to play a “ leading character ” in advancing BRI, to serve as “ advisers and assistants for the government ” in planning policies and designing allow mechanisms, and as “ bridges ” between the political level and the public opinion. 30 many new “ Belt and Road ” inquiry centers have been created within chinese universities and think tanks in order to develop cryptic expertness on Belt and Road countries and to support the central leadership ’ sulfur policies. International outreach is besides expanding, by and large under the auspices of the CCP Central Committee ’ s International Liaison Department ( CCP/ILD ). Through its in-house think cooler, the China Center for Contemporary World Studies ( CCCWS, 中联部当代世界研究中心 ), the CCP/ILD acts as the national secretariat for outreach activities directed at think tanks and inquiry centers in Belt and Road countries .
The objectives of the modern BRI academic cooperation platforms appear to be threefold :
- first, as with journalists and the media community, to influence and shape the perceptions of populace intellectuals so they view BRI as a positive undertake ;
- second, to gain entree to knowledge, skills and technologies studied in foreign universities inquiry centers and laboratories. This is part of a broader feat to serve the same objectives through a battalion of other mechanisms ;
- third, to become engaged in foreign educational systems ( particularly in the develop Belt and Road countries ) as a longer-term attempt to shape and affect how the future generations of local elites are educated and trained .
Silk Road Think Tank Association (一带一路智库合作联盟)
31 The CCP/ILD has sponsored the universe of a Belt and Road Think Tank Cooperation Alliance ( 一带一路智库合作联盟 ), translated in English as “ Silk Road Think Tank Association ” ( SRTA ), launched in April 2015. 32 Jin Xin 金鑫, CCCWS ’ s Director-General, is the Think Tank Alliance ’ s Secretary General, and is assisted by three co-Chairmen ( see table below ). 33
Co-Chairmen of the “Belt and Road Think Tank Cooperation Alliance”
( “ 一带一路 ” 智库合作联盟理事会共同理事长 )
| 郭业洲 中共中央对外联络部副部长 |
Guo Yezhou Vice Minister, CCP/ILD |
| 焦扬 复旦大学党委书记 |
Jiao Yang Party Secretary of Fudan University |
| 魏建国 中国国际经济交流中心副理事长 |
Wei Jianguo Vice-Chairman of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges ( CCIEE ) |
The platform includes over 50 chinese inquiry institutions ( including DRC, CASS, Fudan University and others ) in an effort to coordinate domestic intellectual resources, and with a mission to intensify alleged “ lead 2 ” diplomacy with the outdoor global. Under the Think Tank Alliance ’ second horizon, exchanges with foreign think tanks are intended to “ enhance the accurate understand of BRI ” and to “ enhance convinced feelings ” towards the first step within local public opinion. 34
35 SRTA ’ s external weapon ( 一带一路国际智库合作联盟, Belt and Road International Think Tank Cooperation Alliance ) was launched in Shenzhen in February 2016, keeping the SRTA acronym. Guo Yezhou ( 郭业洲 ), the Vice-Minister of the CCP/ILD and Chairman of the CCCWS Council gave a keynote actor’s line at the opening ceremony. 36
SiLKS (丝路国际智库网络)
37 Through its Development Research Center ( DRC ), the National Development and Reform Commission ( NDRC ) has for its contribution launched the “ Silk Road Think Tank Network ” ( SiLKS, 丝路国际智库网络 ), inaugurated by 43 establish parties during the October 2015 Madrid Silk Road Forum, with the mission of “ inspiring the cognition coevals, sharing and application of remember tanks in an campaign to jointly build the Belt and Road and to contribute to the sustainable development. ” 38 The NDRC is a central player in the supervision, coordination and implementation of the BRI. It hosts the Office of the Politburo BRI Leading Small Group and manages the daily activities and decision-making related to BRI. Within the NDRC ’ mho Office of the BRI Leading Small Group, a “ Belt and Road Promotion Center ” was created in 2017. 39 SiLKS ’ s secretariat is hosted by the DRC ’ s Department of International Cooperation. Although not an immediately apparent part of the SiLKS network, the CCP/ILD is never far away : Jin Xin gave the open remarks at the May 16, 2017 SiLKS meet in Beijing .
Image source: “Silk Road Think Tank Network 2017 Annual Meeting held in Beijing,” eSilks, June 5, 2017.
Image source: “Silk Road Forum Held in Madrid,” Geoeconomic Forum, October 28, 2015.
Members of the First SiLKS Steering Committee 40
| Organization | Name of Commissioner | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Development Research Center of the State Council of China | Li Wei | President |
| United Nations Development Programme | Xu Haoliang | Assistant Administrator and Director of the Asia-Pacific Bureau |
| International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development | Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz | Chief Executive |
| United Nations Industrial Development Organization | Zou Ciyong | Director of Department of Partnerships & Results Monitoring |
| OECD Development Center | Mario Pezzini | Director |
| Mekong Institute | Watcharas Leelawath | Director |
| Institute of World Economics and Politics under the Foundation of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan | Yerzhan Saltybayev | Director |
| Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia | Jusuf Wanandi | Vice Chairman |
| Elcano Royal Institute of Spain | Charles Powell | Director |
| Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development | Vuk Jeremić | President |
| Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Science | Sergei Luzianin | Director |
SiLKS is one of the six partners of the “ Global Coalition of Think Tank Networks for South-South Cooperation ” launched jointly by UNDP and UNOSSC ( UN Office for South-South Cooperation ) in 2016. 41
RANDI (蓝迪国际智库平台)
42 Another cooperative think cooler platform, normally translated in English as “ Research and Development International ” or RDI ( 蓝迪国际智库平台, Landi International Think Tank Platform ) and chaired by Zhao Baige 赵白鸽, frailty president of the National People ’ s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, was launched in April 2015. 43 Composed of the chinese Academy of Social Sciences ( CASS ) and the China Institute for Reform and Development ( CIRD ), RDI partnered with the Islamabad-based Pakistan-China Institute to establish a articulation think tank dedicated to the study of the China-Pakistan economic corridor ( CPEC ) on April 18, 2015, two days before eleven Jinping ’ s first State inflict to Pakistan. 44 The name of the newfangled Sino-Pakistani think tank car, RANDI, has been wide ridiculed in South Asia because it sounds like “ whore ” in Urdu and Hindi. 45 RANDI is co-chaired by Zhao Baige and Senator Mushahid Hussain, and has two secretariats – one located within the Pakistan-China Institute, the other co-hosted by CASS and CIRD. 46 CCP/ILD Vice-Minister Guo Yezhou addressed a RDI “ Belt and Road ” seminar in Beijing in March 2016. 47
Image source: “Research and Development International (RDI),” Pakistan-China Institute, June 1, 2015.
Read more: Australia Maritime Strategy
Belt and Road Studies Network (一带一路国际智库合作委员会)
48 The latest accession to the panoply of unite front entities designed to target international think tanks is the Belt and Road International Think Tank Cooperation Committee ( 一带一路国际智库合作委员会 ) formally translated as the “ Belt and Road Studies Network ” ( BRSN ). It was inaugurated during the Second Beijing Belt and Road Forum on April 24, 2019 with 16 founding members or “ initiators. ” 49 BRSN ’ south chair is the president of Xinhua News Agency, Cai Mingzhao 蔡名照 .
The 16 “Initiators” of the Belt and Road Studies Network 50
| Xinhua Institute | PRC – part of the CCP/CC/Propaganda Department |
| Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) | PRC – |
| China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) | PRC – |
| China Center for Contemporary World Studies (CCCWS) | PRC – part of the CCP/CC/International Liaison Department |
| China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) | PRC – part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC) | PRC – |
| Institute of New Structural Economics at Peking University | PRC – |
| The Belt and Road Research Institute | PRC – Beijing Normal University |
| Bulgaria National Association for the Belt and Road | Bulgaria – est. April 2017, chaired by Prof Zahari Zahariev |
| The African Center for Economic Transformation | Ghana – est. 2008, chaired by Dr. K.Y. Amoako |
| Center for Strategic and International Studies | Indonesia – est. 1971, chaired by Philips J. Vermonte |
| Nazarbayev University | Kazakhstan – chaired by Shigeo Katsu |
| East Asia Institute | ROK – est. 2002, chaired by Prof. Young-Sun Ha |
| New Silk Road Institute | ROK – est. 2017 |
| The Valdai Discussion Club | Russia – est. 2004, chaired by Andrey Bystritskiy |
| Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at the Harvard Kennedy School | USA – est. 2003, chaired by Prof. Anthony Saich |
Image source: “Belt and Road Studies Network Inaugurated,” Xinhua via Beijing Review, April 25, 2019.
chinese and alien members of the Alliance, SiLKS, RDI and the Network sometimes overlap. There does not seem to be a clear geographic or thematic division of undertaking among the unlike entities. There is little doubt however that the international seminars and workshops they sponsor provide countless channels of communication through which to relay the Party line and BRI ’ s positive narrative. International participants are expected to absorb the information given by their chinese counterparts and possibly evening to integrate it into their own analyses. If they are alien think tankers, there is a possibility that this data might finally appear in the reports that they produce for their respective governments, hence directly impacting local policymakers ’ perceptions of BRI .
Multiple “ alliances ” have besides been created to target more specifically international universities along the Belt and Road. The take after section attempts to list them. Joint Belt and Road research centers and bilateral agreements between chinese universities and extraneous counterparts are not systematically included .
University Alliance of the Silk Road (丝绸之路大学联盟)
51 The University Alliance of the Silk Road ( UASR, 丝绸之路大学联盟 ) was launched by Xi ’ an Jiaotong University ( XJU, 西安交通大学 ) on May 22, 2015 on the margins of an educational cooperation fairly for countries along the Silk Road, and initially included 20 universities from 22 countries. 52 The UASR Secretariat is located within XJU ’ s western Science and Technology Innovation Hub ( 西部科技创新港 ) and is chaired by professor Yang Xiao 杨笑. 53 By 2017, UASR had included 135 member universities from 35 countries 54 and XJU had individually signed cooperation agreements with 29 universities members of the Alliance, including a joint lab on micro and nano-fabrication with the University of New South Wales 55 and a joint university center with Liverpool University, based in Suzhou. 56 UASR upholds the “ Silk Road emotional state of peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, common learn and reciprocal benefit and win-win ” and vows to foster the realization of a “ Silk Road Academic Belt. ” 57 UASR set up four “ sub-alliances ” centered around law ( 丝绸之路法学院联盟 ), management ( 丝绸之路管理学院联盟 ), forensics ( SRFC, 丝路法医联盟 ) 58 and advanced manufacture and nanotechnologies ( 丝绸之路先进制造和纳米技术子联盟 ), 59 adenine well as the Silk Road Economic Belt Collaborative Innovation Center ( 丝绸之路经济带合作创新中心 ), the eurasian Economic Forum Research Institute ( 欧亚经济论坛研究所 ) and the BRI Free Trade Area Research Institute ( 一带一路倡议自由贸易区研究所 ). 60
Silk Road Forensics Consortium (丝路法医联盟)
61 The Silk Road Forensics Consortium ( SRFC, 丝路法医联盟, Silk Road Forensics Alliance ) 62 is worth examining in more detail. SRFC ’ s founding conference was held on October 30–31, 2016 in Xi ’ an. It was jointly organized by XJU, Shaanxi Province Department of Human Resources and Social Security ( 陕西省人力资源和社会保障部 ), Shaanxi Province Bureau of Foreign Experts ( 陕西省外国专家局 ), Xi ’ an modern Fendong zone administrative committee ( 西安新区凤东新城管委会 ) and Shenzhen Huada ( 深圳华大基因科技有限公司 / 华达基因 ), besides known as BGI Genomics, a biotechnology growth company that specializes in genic examination and agricultural genomics inquiry. 63 During the second gear international league held in Xi ’ an in November 2017 which included over 50 alien experts from 20 countries, BGI Genomics signed a MOU with Poland ’ s Central Police Forensic Laboratory to create a joint experimental center, 64 and with XJU and Moscow State University to besides establish a China-Russia joint experimental center. Professor Henry C. Lee ( 李昌鈺 ), a leading Chinese-American forensics expert, is the president of SRFC. 65
Above: Adam Frankowski (Poland police). Below: representatives from BGI-Genomics, University of Warsaw, the Russian Academy of Sciences and XJU. Source: “Scientific Conferences of Silk Road Forensic Consortium in China,” Central Forensic Laboratory of the Police, November 7, 2017.
SRFC formally acts as a “ platform ” for forensic experts from China and abroad to exchange ideas. however, its potential implications go beyond bare academician exchanges among experts from Belt and Road countries. During the third SRFC international conference, Prof. Henry C. Lee called for the SFRC members to “ build a reciprocal deoxyribonucleic acid database to better serve solve condemnable cases. ” According to Professor Li Shenbing, the development of unite DNA recognition standards and identification procedures regulations would help fight against crime, “ specially cross-regional crime and terrorism. ” 66 The internationalization of chinese standards has been identified by the Party-State as one of the key domains that will “ provide comprehensive corroborate ” for the structure of BRI, and calibration in the Humanities is one of the areas envisaged. 67 A specific “ Belt and Road University Alliance for Standardization Education and Academics ” ( 一带一路标准化教育与研究大学联盟成立 ) was created in May 2018 to support that feat. 68
SRFC Committees 69
Organizing Committee
| Prof. Henry C. Lee | University of New Haven | USA |
| Prof. Tadeusz Tomaszewski | University of Warsaw | Poland |
| Prof. Li Shengbin | Xi’an Jiaotong University | P.R.China |
Scientific Committee
| Prof. Henry C. Lee | University of New Haven | USA |
| Prof. Tadeusz Tomaszewski | University of Warsaw | Poland |
| Prof. Li Shengbin | Xi’an Jiaotong University | P.R.China |
| Prof. Niels Morling | University of Copenhagen | Denmark |
| Prof. Vugar Mammadov | World Association for Medical Law | Azerbaijan |
| Prof. Yuri Pigolkin | First Moscow State Medical University of Sechenov | Russia |
Advisory Board
| Prof. Kamiel Samy Gabriel | University of Ontario Institute of Technology | Canada |
| Dr. Lan Zhuangli | Shaanxi Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs | P.R.China |
| Dr. Liu Shaowen | Ministry of Justice | P.R.China |
| Dr. Liu Yao | Chinese Academy of Engineering | P.R.China |
| Dr. Wang Jian | BGI-Shenzhen | P.R.China |
| Dr. Wang Shuguo | Xi’an Jiaotong University | P.R.China |
| Dr. Yang Huanming | BGI-Shenzhen | P.R.China |
| Dr. Yan Hong | Xi’an Jiaotong University | P.R.China |
| Dr. Yang Shuang | BGI-Shenzhen | P.R.China |
| Dr. Yu Jun | Beijing Institute of Genomics, Chinese Academy of Sciences | P.R.China |
| Dr. Zhang Maizeng | Xi’an Jiaotong University | P.R.China |
| Prof. Dragan Primorac | International Affairs Committee of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences | Croatia |
| Prof. Damir Marjanović | International Burch University | Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| Prof. Prasanta Kumar Chattopadhyay | Punjabi University, Patiala | India |
| Dr. Rajinder Singh | Punjabi University | India |
| Prof. Imad M.Al-Abdallat | The University of Jordan | Jordan |
| Prof. Yury Bikbaev | Kazakhstan Ministry of Justice and the World Bank | Kazakhstan |
| Prof. Henryk Malewski | Mykolas Romeris University | Lithuania |
| Insp. Adam Frankowski | Central Forensic Lab of the Police | Poland |
| Prof. Ewa J. Bulska | University of Warsaw | Poland |
| Dr. Zanetta Makowska | Central Forensic Lab of the Police | Poland |
| Dr. Magdalena Spólnick | Central Forensic Lab of the Police | Poland |
| Prof. Piotr A. Girdwoyń | University of Warsaw | Poland |
| Dr. Taiyana Averianova | Russian State University of Justice | Russian Federation |
| Dr. Tatiana Moiseeva | Russian State University of Justice | Russian Federation |
| Prof. Osama Almadani | Exam Committee Forensic Medicine, SCFHS Riyadh | Saudi Arabia |
| Mr. Ivan Dombrovskiy | Ministry of Internal Affairs | Ukraine |
| Dr. Carol Cox | University of Central Lancashire | U.K. |
| Dr. Clive D. Tattum | University of Central Lancashire | U.K. |
| Prof. Robert E. Barsley | LSU School of Dentistry | U.S.A. |
| Dr. Mario Thomas Gaboury | University of New Haven | U.S.A. |
| Prof. Daniel J. May | University of New Haven | U.S.A. |
| Prof. Robert E. Gaensslen | Forensic Science Program Accreditation Commission | U.S.A. |
| Prof. Haskell M. Pitluck | NIST OSAC Odontology Subcommittee | U.S.A. |
| Dr. Michael F. Rieders | FRF FOUNDATION Center for Forensic Sciences Research and Education | U.S.A. |
| Dr. David W. Webb | University of New Haven | U.S.A. |
| Prof. David N. Wecht | Supreme Court Justice on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania | U.S.A. |
University Alliance of the Belt and Road (一带一路高校联盟)
70 The University Alliance of the Belt and Road ( UAB & R, 一带一路高校联盟, Belt and Road Higher Education Alliance ) was established in Dunhuang on October 17, 2015 by Lanzhou University, Fudan University, Beijing Normal University, and the Ural National Economics University of Russia. 71 It has expanded from 47 member universities from 8 countries to 126 universities from 25 countries. 72 Its secretariat is hosted by Lanzhou University ’ s International Cooperation and Exchange Office. 73 several international MOUs focusing on cooperation in scientific inquiry were signed during its inaugural international conference, held on the margins of the Dunhuang Silk Road International Cultural Expo in September 2016. 74 Pictures taken at the event display that it was jointly sponsored by the Propaganda Department of the Gansu Provincial CCP Committee and the Gansu Province Education Department .
Image source: “首届”一带一路”高校联盟论坛在敦煌举行” [First Belt and Road Higher Education Alliance Forum Held in Dunhuang], Lanzhou University International Cooperation and Exchange Office, September 22, 2016.
A branch of UAB & R was established in Shenyang on November 22, 2018 within Northeastern University. At the founding ceremony, Feng Shouquan 冯守权, director of Shenyang ’ s Propaganda Department and secretary of the Education, Scientific and Cultural Committee, stressed the authoritative part Shenyang had to play in constructing the China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor, and called for the outgrowth extremity universities to “ serve the regional social and economic development in a offer to help revitalize Northeast China and boost the transformation and upgrade of Shenyang by providing homo and technical foul hold to the city ’ mho construction and the development of its real economy. ” 75
University Consortium of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (21世纪海上丝绸之路”大学联盟)
76 The inauguration meeting of the “ University Consortium of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road ” ( UCMSR, “ 21世纪海上丝绸之路 ” 大学联盟 ) was hosted by Xiamen University on October 20, 2018. 77 The alliance, whose secretariat is hosted by Xiamen university, 78 is formally composed of 66 universities ( including 36 from China ) from 15 countries along the nautical Silk Road. 79 A nearer spirit at the member universities shows however that membership is not based on geographic placement : the US, France, the UK, Japan and South Korea are not located on the Maritime Silk Road and yet are represented. UCMSR is committed to develop international cooperation in personnel training and technological invention and to “ become the vanguard ” in implementing the twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road development scheme. 80
Image source: “Inauguration Ceremony of the University Consortium of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and University Presidents’ Forum,” UCMSR, August 7, 2018.
The list of Belt and Road academic alliances is long and growing. In addition to the few mentioned above, some alliances are more specifically dedicated to a given domain, such as textiles ( 一带一路世界纺织大学联盟, Belt and Road World Alliance of Textile Universities ), 81 architecture ( 一带一路建筑类大学国际联盟, Belt and Road Architecture University International Consortium, BRAUIC ), 82 technical skills ( 一带一路暨金砖国家技能发展国际联盟, International Alliance of Skills Development for Belt and Road and BRICS Countries, IASDBR ), 83 railways ( 一带一路铁路国际人才教育联盟, Belt and Road Railway International Talent Education Alliance, RTEA ), 84 aerospace invention ( 一带一路航天创新联盟, Belt and Road Aerospace Innovation Alliance, BRAIA ), 85 medical education ( 一带一路国际医学教育联盟, Belt and Road International Medical Education Alliance, BRIMEA ), 86 engineer department of education ( 一带一路工程教育国际联盟, International Alliance of Engineering Education for the Belt and Road ), 87 scientific organizations ( 一带一路科技组织联盟, Alliance of Scientific Organizations in the Belt and Road Region, ANSO ), 88 scientific research institute ( 一带一路科研院所联盟, Belt and Road Scientific Research Institute Alliance ), 89 and academic print ( 一带一路学术出版联盟, Belt and Road Academic Publishing Alliance, BR-APA ). 90
The creation of the University Alliance of the Silk Road and of the University Alliance of the Belt and Road in 2015 foreshadowed the “ Education Action Plan for the BRI ” launched in July 2016 by the ministry of Education, which envisions cooperation with Belt and Road countries in the field of department of education as a way to “ build an integrate educational community. ” Among early objectives, the design encourages chinese universities to “ steadily expand cooperation and exchanges with their counterparts ” in Belt and Road countries. 91 It besides makes it clear that international education cooperation is regarded as a joyride to bring “ closer people-to-people ties, ” and “ educate supporting endowment ” that can “ buttress the efforts ” dedicated to the success of BRI. 92 This means in impression that the BRI education plan is underpinned by the same principles that guide other abroad unite movement activities : it is designed to coopt foreigners to support and promote the CCP ’ randomness foreign policy goals – in this case, BRI. Although not typically identified as a unite battlefront entity on equality with, for exemplar, the CCP/ILD or CCP/UFWD, the ministry of Education nevertheless takes contribution in the unite front work. This is, after all, a “ job of all CCP Party-State-Military agencies. ” 93
The trope of China ’ second dominating the future world economy thanks, in part, to BRI, serves as a rally cry for chinese universities to induce overseas counterparts to not be left behind. This kind of language can be effective. As one british academic puts it : “ Those european businesses and universities smart and swift enough to forge durable partnerships with suitable chinese universities will no doubt position themselves identical favorably to take full advantage of the at hand and momentous transfer in the economic and educational remainder of baron from West to East. ” 94 The british Chamber of Commerce in China recently published a composition identifying BRI educational plans as a potential sphere of battle, provided a certain number of benchmarks ( high standards and asperity, fiscal duty, sustainability and ethics ) are guaranteed. 95
In the case of educational cooperation, the “ Belt and Road ” or “ Silk Road ” label is used as a market tease designed to attract new customers to engage with China on issues beyond education. The limit between academic exchanges and particular technological and industrial know-how transfers can be blurry, specially as some taiwanese business companies are besides actively involved in a number of these academic alliances. Foreign universities uncoerced to join Belt and Road education alliances should make certain they understand who their taiwanese partners are, what their objectives are, what their joint research will be used for, and pay particular attention to the possibility of dual-use applications. 96 In the long run, Beijing ’ s emerging efforts to standardize education along the Silk Roads could besides shape the future code of conduct followed by regional universities, particularly how they approach data management, research integrity, ethics, open access, and academic exemption. 97
3. Business
together with foreign media and the academic populace, the clientele community has besides become one of the darling targets of China ’ s tug for shaping international perceptions of BRI as a convinced endeavor. here, unite front operations play on familiar grounds : the international corporate world has for decades been nurtured and coaxed into believing promises of profitable gains that the massive taiwanese market and a growing chinese economy would offer. local business communities have been used as lobby groups nudging their government representatives to favor policies of battle with China. similar themes are now weaved around BRI. To the cosmopolitan occupation community, the BRI-related narrative is broadly one of not-to-be-missed money-making opportunity. United front work aims to ensure that Beijing ’ s messages about BRI ’ s “ peaceful intentions, the benefits of closer economic ties, the economic damage from a fall-out ” will be communicated by local “ faces and voices, ” thereby giving it greater authenticity. 98
The expected outcomes are twofold : one, to attract extraneous businesses to work on concrete Belt and Road projects, specially in sectors where chinese companies lack competence ( such as for example, fiscal services, or some recess technological providers ) ; and two, to cultivate local businessmen and big economic actors to gain increase entree to politicians and high-level civil servants of Belt and Road countries. 99 The BRI message dissemination and cooptation process is conducted via multiple mechanisms that take the shape, among others, of associations for the promotion of international trade, Silk Road business councils, and Silk Road Chambers of Commerce .
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (中国国际贸易促进委员会)
100 The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade ( CCPIT, 中国国际贸易促进委员会 ) is listed by a May 1957 CIA report as a unite front administration, i.e. “ an instrument used by the CCP to mobilize a number of federations and authoritative persons in support of an important propaganda program. ” CCPIT ’ mho objectives are described as twofold : “ ( 1 ) to persuade businessmen in non-Communist countries that strategic embargoes on trade wind with the soviet bloc and China are damaging to their own interests ; and ( 2 ) to develop trade relations with non-Communist countries. ” 101 These objectives have obviously evolved since 1957 but CCPIT has an enduring function as an instrument to engage authoritative foreign businessmen for trade and investing related issues. CCPIT ’ s current Secretary-General, Yu Jianlong 于健龙, placid believes that its task is to serve the Party ’ s BRI objectives and sees clientele communities as “ a driving force in the promotion of the Belt and Road. ” 102
CCPIT has recently teamed up with the World Chambers Federation to “ encourage more business communities to participate in China ’ south Belt and Road initiative. ” In April 2018, the partners organized in Beijing a forum focused on “ Belt and Road deal and investing ” for over 600 participants from 70 countries 103 with the aim of making “ worldly concern business communities more convinced about participating in Belt and Road construction. ” 104
CCPIT besides acts as secretariat for taiwanese Chambers of Commerce. Under its patronage, the China Chamber of Commerce in the UK 105 hosted a forum in London in January 2018, exploring “ newfangled areas for China-UK cooperation, ” taking the opportunity of ” jointly building the ‘ One Belt & One Road ’ projects ” and “ in the context of a post-Brexit market, ” exploring “ new models, new projects and new areas for both british and chinese enterprises. ” 106
In the same room that Belt and Road “ alliances ” committed to promote external BRI cooperation with journalists and academics have emerged, several newly-created Silk Road business associations are now actively trying to rally ball-shaped CEOs and enjoin them to cooperate with chinese partners to ultimately serve the Party ’ randomness objectives. As Dr. Gerry Groot notes, “ Chambers of commerce provide a useful side for dealings with foreigners, while associations allow the UFWD to discreetly manage more directly political aspects. ” 107
Silk Road Chamber of International Commerce (丝绸之路国际总商会)
108 Among the most proactive is the “ Silk Road Chamber of International Commerce ” ( SRCIC, 丝绸之路国际总商会 ), which, according to its web site, counts 110 members from 75 countries, “ forming a community of share interests, shared responsibilities and a share future ” with the objective of serving “ as a bridge connect enterprises and governments, creating a cooperative platform between business associations and SRCIC members. It besides is a key voice in the promotion of Belt and Road construction and plays a full of life character in advancing economic and social development with an vehemence on international collaboration and global government. ” 109 The terminology similarity with the Party ’ mho “ community of shared future ” ( 人类命运共同体 ) mantra is obtrusive. 110
Although founded ( in December 2015 ) and based in Hong Kong, SRCIC ’ sulfur secretariat is in Xi ’ an, hometown of its president, Lü Jianzhong 吕建中, a member of the CPPCC. 111 Lü is besides founding chair and director of DTXS Silk Road Investment, executive committee member of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce ( ACFIC ), and vice-President of the China International Chamber of Commerce affiliated with CCPIT. 112 Mr Lü travels regularly overseas to promote international commercial enterprise cooperation with BRI, and frequently meets with gamey degree political circles. 113 SRCIC ’ s vice-chairman and secretary general is Li Zhonghang 李中航, a former PLA colonel and CEO of Tang West Market Group. 114
In February 2019, SRCIC offered two-week internships to 7 Fulbright students. 115 It is besides sponsoring scholarships through a Silk Road Sunshine Fund created in 2016 to support outstanding graduate students from Belt and Road countries to study in Xi ’ an. SRCIC ’ mho partners are Xi ’ an Jiaotong University, Northwest Polytechnical University, Northwest University, Chang ’ an University and Shaanxi Normal University. 116
Belt and Road Industrial and Commercial Alliance (一带一路工商协会联盟)
117 The “ Belt and Road Industrial and Commercial Alliance ” ( BRICA, 一带一路工商协会联盟, Belt and Road Industrial and Commercial Association Alliance ), was founded with the approval of the Office of the Belt and Road Leading Small Group ( 推进 “ 一带一路 ” 建设工作领导小组办公室 ) and is sponsored by the China Federation of Industrial Economics ( CFIE, 中国工业经济联合会 ). 118 The establish ceremony took home at the Diaoyutai State Guest House in Beijing in June 2016. 119 several big United Front personalities preside over BRICA ’ second activities : Chen Yuan 陈元 ( Chen Yun ’ s son ) vice-chairman of the 12th National Committee of the CPPCC and Gu Xiulian 顾秀莲 vice-chairman of the tenth National People ’ s Congress Standing Committee and honorary President of CFIE, serve as counselors ; Li Yizhong 李毅中 member of the Standing Committee of the 12th National Committee of the CPPCC and president of the united states of CFIE, serves as one of the 22 co-chairmen of the alliance from 20 countries ; 120 Xiong Meng 熊梦, vice-chairman and secretary-general of CFIE, serves as BRICA ’ s secretary-general. Li Yizhong stated that BRICA will “ actively encourage members to participate in [ BRI ], facilitate information partake and duplicate of projects, and link the first step with the Made in China 2025 strategy. ” 121
Image source: “BRICA — A new alliance established in Beijing,” China Fastener, June 17, 2016.
Belt and Road Alliance of International Chambers of Commerce (一带一路国际商业协作联盟)
122 The Belt and Road Alliance of International Chambers of Commerce ( AICC, 一带一路国际商业协作联盟 ), located in Guangzhou, was jointly established by the Guangdong General Chamber of Commerce and the Guangzhou General Chamber of Commerce. It comprises 36 domestic and 35 extraneous business chambers – although it is not clear from the list available on its web site if these are foreign or chinese chambers based abroad. 123 AICC ’ s international activities seem to be much more circumscribed than SRCIC .
Belt and Road General Chamber of Commerce (一带一路总商会)
124 Building on Hong Kong ’ sulfur repute as a central platform for external craft and fiscal exchanges, a group of tycoons established in September 2017 the “ Belt and Road General Chamber of Commerce ” ( 一帶一路總商會 ) to “ promote closer relations and trade between Hong Kong and Southeast asian countries. ” 125 The four initiation billionaires are Peter Lam ( 林建岳 ), chair of the Lai Sun Group and Media Asia Group, and a member of the standing committee of the CPPCC ; Pan Sutong 潘苏通, CEO of Goldin Real Estate Holdings and penis of the CPPCC ; 126 the Sino-Thai property developer Chanchai Ruayrungruang ( 严彬 ), CEO of Reignwood Group and penis of the CPPCC ; 127 and Cheng Cheung-Ling 鄭翔玲, CEO of the Tai Pharmaceutical Group and member of the CPPCC. 128 blunt about the Chamber ’ randomness target as a supporting branch of Beijing ’ s Belt and Road policy, Ms Cheng said the Chamber would “ work as a accessory to the mainland government in terms of Belt and Road connections with other countries on the path. ” 129 Carrie Lam and Leung Chun-ying 梁振英, vice-chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC and Lam ’ south harbinger as Hong Kong Chief Executive, were present at the Chamber ’ s inauguration ceremony on April 17, 2018. 130
Image source: “出席一帶一路總商會就職典禮 林鄭：香港將更好地融入中國發展大” [Carrie Lam Attends Belt and Road General Chamber of Commerce Inauguration Ceremony: Hong Kong Will Better Merge into China’s Development], TMHK, April 17, 2018.
Belt and Road Global Forum (一带一路国际联盟)
131 Hong Kong is by and large a identical proactive promoter of BRI. The Hong Kong Trade Development Council ( HKTDC ) hosts and sponsors diverse platforms to enhance the visibility of Beijing ’ s inaugural, including a web portal vein 132 and the Belt and Road Global Forum ( 一帶一路國際聯盟, Belt and Road International Alliance ), inaugurated in June 2018. The Forum includes “ chambers of department of commerce, industry associations, investment promotion agencies and think tanks ” totaling 110 members from 29 countries, with HKTDC serving as its secretariat. 133 Its self-described mission is to “ support the progress of the BRI through Hong Kong by bringing together local and international organizations committed to the Initiative, and helping them plug in and create business opportunities together. ” 134
Silk Road International Association (丝路国际联盟)
135 The “ Silk Road International Association ” ( SRIA, 丝路国际联盟, Silk Road International Alliance ) is an outgrowth of the International Finance Forum ( IFF, 国际金融论坛 ) which was founded in Beijing in 2003 with the mission of “ establishing regular dialogue and communications at highest level, while conducting research on global fiscal matters. ” 136 IFF includes both high-level Chinese and foreign political and fiscal leaders. Since December 2018, its chair is Zhou Xiaochuan 周小川, vice-chairman of the 12th CPPCC and former Governor of the People ’ s Bank of China. 137 SRIA was established during the IFF ’ randomness 2016 annual conference and includes “ early political leaders, experts, scholars, economic and fiscal institutions, and outstanding entrepreneurs from countries participating in the BRI. ” SRIA formally wows to “ enhance reciprocal trust and build consensus by carrying forward the ‘ Silk Road spirit ’ of peace and co-operation, openness and inclusiveness, common learning and reciprocal benefit, and win-win outcomes. With the recognition of and consensus on the core values of the BRI, the SRIA aims to provide a mechanism that boosts non-governmental collaboration and dialogue ” 138 – a affirmation that toes, about discussion for word, the Belt and Road Party lineage .
The SRIA ’ s inaugural address meet, co-hosted by SRIA and China News Service ( 中国新闻社 ) was held in June 2017 in Hangzhou where it has established its headquarters. 139 Former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon sent a congratulatory letter, expressing his “ firm impression ” that SRIA would “ make big contributions to the realization of the goals of the BRI and that IFF members w [ ould ] in full devote themselves to realizing the vision of the modern Silk Road. ” 140 senior leaders from taiwanese SOEs such as the China Railway Group, China Construction Bank and Everbright Securities were present. Former New Zealand Prime Minister Jenny Shipley was besides attending, and praised BRI as a “ massively bad mind, connecting a range of countries ” in an “ inspired ” way. 141
Image source: IFF.
Conclusion
A Leninist concept invented a hundred years ago 142 is at the heart of the taiwanese Party-State ’ s efforts to promote and support the Belt and Road Initiative, Xi Jinping ’ mho “ undertaking of the Century. ” rather of getting stuck in the early soviet revolutionary times, unite front tactics “ in the new era ” are evolving and adapting. xi has raised the status of the United Front Work Department, consolidate CCP control over Party-State organizations that are responsible for executing connect front man bring, and intensified its domestic and overseas undertakings. 143 Historically, the independent target of unite front bring outside the PRC has been abroad chinese communities, but the considerable expansion of Xi ’ second alien policy agenda has brought these activities to new regions where oversea chinese communities are not necessarily well established. There, the traditional unite front approaches have given way to “ creative adaptation ” 144 which is besides reflected in the extensive world wide web of new joined front entities that have emerged since 2015 145 specifically devoted to the external progress of the BRI objectives. As unify front tactics are nowadays applied globally and unite front entities are projecting outwards using BRI ’ randomness entreaty, they largely target local elites ( journalists, intellectuals, students, business people ) that constitute the enduring spine of local societies, implanting their influence in newly-created friendly networks for years to come .
This paper has attempted to compile the main Belt and Road united front man entities targeting foreign media, academic, and business communities. Although incomplete, 146 it constitutes a first gradation in mapping the setting of the Party-State ’ randomness efforts dedicated to inducing and coopting foreign groups into supporting the BRI causal agent. The tilt of “ Belt and Road alliances ” ( 一带一路联盟 ) bears come to similarities with long-standing joined movement entities traditionally used to mobilize specific groups and sectors outside of the CCP, such as the diverse “ all-China federations, ” ( 中华全国联合会 ), “ friendship associations ” with foreign countries ( 对外友好协会 ) and “ passive reunion councils ” ( 和平统一促进会 ) and their twin local chapters. 147 As a tactic, unite front is not limited within a particular bureaucracy, and it can “ be innovatively employed through new channels, ” but its ultimate goal remains constant : to help forge “ impermanent tactical alliances with local anesthetic elites in areas beyond send Party control ” and to “ advance the CCP ’ s strategic goals in environments the Party can not so far control by more direct lotion of coerce. ” 148
Read more: MARITIME SILK ROAD | Facts and Details
The chinese leadership is using all available means, brusque of military invasion, to achieve BRI ’ sulfur ultimate objective – the creation of a “ community of common fortune. ” 149 To this end, tried and tested unite front tactics are the CCP ’ s natural element of choice. With its newfangled Belt and Road “ alliances, ” the Party-State is pouring old unify front wine into new, satiny, containers .
Nadège Rolland is elder Fellow for Political and Security Affairs at the Seattle-based National Bureau of Asian Research ( NBR ) and the generator of China ’ mho eurasian hundred : political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative ( 2017 ) .
Sinopsis is a collaborative project between the Institute of East asian Studies at Charles University in Prague and the non-profit AcaMedia Institute. The Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences (CAS), a public research institution, co-organised the 2019 Sinopsis workshop with fiscal support from CAS Strategy AV21 .